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This paper concerns the language L(Q) which is formed by add- 
ing, to the first order predicate logic L with identity, the additional 
quantifier (Qx) with the interpretation "there are uncountably 
many x". The language L(Q) was first studied by Mostowski [23] 
who proposed the problem of finding an analogue of the G6del 
completeness theorem for it. Fuhrken [6] proved that the com- 
pactness theorem holds for L(Q), and Vaught [31 ] proved that the 
set of valid formulas in L(Q) is recursively enumerable. Vaught's 
proof also gave a completeness theorem for L(Q), but with a very 
complicated set of axioms; his method's were refined in [4] and 
[15] to give somewhat less complex axioms. 
In this paper we shall prove that the completeness theorem for 
L(Q) holds with the following very simple set of axiom schemes: 
7(Qx)(x = y v x -  z) ; 
(Vx)(~o-+ if)-+ ((Qx)~o-+ (Qx)~) ; 
(Qx) ~(x) ++ (Qy)~(y) ; 
(Qy)(3x)~o -+ (3x)(Qy)~0 v (Qx)(3y)9. 
Precisely these axioms were considered by Craig and Fuhrken in 
1962, and they conjectured that the completeness theorem for 
L(Q) is true with these axioms. We prove their conjecture in w 
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Our method of  proof is along-the lines of the paper [ 16]. To prove 
the completeness theorem one must show that every consistent set 
F of sentences has a model. The main difficulty (as pointed out by 
Slomson [27]) in constructing a model ~[ of s is to keep the set of 
elements of g[ satisfying a formula ~(x) countable when 
92 N -3(Qx)~(x). Our key in dealing with this difficulty is the no- 
tion of a model which omits a set of  formulas (e.g. see [ 1 0], [22], 
[32]). In the first stage of the proof, the method of Henkin [ 11 ] is 
used to construct a countable "weak model" of  s in which (Qx) 
is interpreted by some set of subsets of the model (such models are 
called "pseudo-realizations" in [27] ). Then a standard model of 2; 
is constructed as the union of an elementary chain of  6o 1 weak 
models; we use an extension of the methods of Tarski-Vaught [30] 
on elementary chains, and of Henkin [121 and Orey [261 on omit- 
ting types. 
In w we shall prove a stronger form of  the completeness theo- 
rem, Theorem 4.3, which gives a sufficient condition for I~ to have 
a model which omits a given set of  formulas. The completeness 
theorem for L(Q) and Theorem 4.3 are the two main results of the 
paper. 
In w w 3 -5  we shall apply the two main results, as well as their 
proofs, in various ways. For example, we obtain completeness 
theorems for the languages formed by adding the quantifier (Qx) 
to r and to the infinitary logic L~ol~o; see Corollary 3.10 and 
Theorem 4.7. In w 3 we give some applications which concern dif- 
ferent interpretations of the quantifier (Qx); see 3.3, 3.4, 3.11,3.15. 
We list here a selection of other applications which we shall ob- 
tain: 
(a) Let ,p be a sentence of L(Q). If ~0 is valid, or if the axiom of 
constructibility implies that ~0 is valid, then the statement 
" I f  co 1 is regular then ~o is valid" 
can be proved without the axiom of choice (Corollary 3.4.2). 
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(b) Let (A, E) be a countable transitive E-model of ZF in which 
every set of real numbers is Lebesgue measurable, and the axiom of 
choice holds for countable families of sets of real numbers. Then 
there is a transitive E-model (B, c) such that [ 0, 1 ] n B has power 
r 1 in the absolute sense, (B, c> is elementarily equivalent to (A, c), 
and A and B contain exactly the same ordinals. The result also 
holds when "is Lebesgue measurable" is replaced by "has the prop- 
erty of Bake" (see 3.8). 
(c) Let (A, c) be a countable transitive c-model of ZF in which 
there exist Dedekind sets and the axiom of choice holds for count- 
able families of finite sets. Then there is a transitive c-model (B, E) 
which is elementarily equivalent to (A, c ), such that B contains 
exactly the same ordinals as A, and for every d c B which is a Dede- 
kind set in the sense of (B, C), d has power ~O 1 in the absolute sense 
(Corollary 3.9). 
(d) Every countable co-model C of second order number theory 
(with choice) has an elementary extension D which is an co-model 
o f  power co 1. Moreover, i fEc  S(co) is an F ,  set and Cn  E=O, then 
D may be chosen so that D n E= 0 (Theorems 3.13 and 5.13). 
(e) Let F be a theory in first order logic such that, for some 
rn < co, there are uncountably many types in rn variables which are 
consistent with P. Then F has 2 w 1 non-isomorphic models of pow- 
er col (Corollary 5.6). 
Throughout his paper, we shall always assume that L is a count- 
able first order predicate logic with identity. Except when we ex- 
plicitly state otherwise, we shall always assume the axiom of choice. 
Some of the results of this paper were announced in the abstract 
[ 18 ]. Other work on the language L(Q), and on fragments of L(Q), 
can be found in [3], [61, [14], [271, [341. 
This research was supported in part by National Science Founda- 
t ion grants GP-6726, GP-5913, and GP-8569. The author is an 
Alfred P. Sloan fellow. 
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w 1. The language L(Q) 
We shall develop here the formal structure of the language L(Q), 
including the definitions of a formula, axiom, and rule of inference. 
We also introduce two interpretations of L(Q), the standard mod- 
els and the weak models. The standard models are the intended 
interpretations, where (Qx) means "there are uncountably many x", 
while the weak models will be used throughout this paper as the 
chief tool for constructing standard models. We shall establish some 
elementary lemmas which will prepare the way for the proof of the 
completeness theorem in w 2. The axioms 0-5 and rules of infer- 
ence introduced in this section have been considered by Craig and 
Fuhrken, who observed that all consequences of these axioms hold 
in all standard models (and that Lemma 1.5 holds). 
Consider a first order predicate logic L with identity symbol -- 
and a countable list of predicate symbols, function symbols, and 
individual constant symbols. (Countable means of power ~< w.) 
We form the language L(Q) by adding to L a new quantifier (Qx), 
which is read "there are uncountably many x". Thus L(Q) has the 
three quantifiers (3x), (Vx), (Qx). The set of formulas of L(Q) is 
the least set g9 which contains all the atomic formulas of L and has 
the property: 
If ~o,~  9 andy is a variable, then ~0^ 4, 7~0, (3y~o, (Vy~o, and 
(Qy~o a ~. We use the convention that ~o(u 1... v n) denotes a formula 
of L(Q) whose free variables form a subset of (Vl,..., On}. Sentences 
are formulas without free variables. 
By a weak model for L(Q) we mean a pair (9~, q) such that 9I is a 
model for the first-order language L and q is a set of subsets of the 
universe A of gf, i.e. q c S(A). The notion of an n-tuple al, ..., a n CA 
satisfying a formula ~O(Ul, ..., v n) of L(Q) in (~, q) is defined in the 
usual way by induction on the complexity of ~o, and is denoted by 
(~,q) ~ ~0[al, ...,an]. The (Qx) clause in the definition is: 
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(91, q) ~ (Qurn)~[al, ...,a n ] if and only if 
{b~ A: (~d,q) ~ ~[al , . . . ,am_l ,b,  arn+ ~ ..... an] } E q ,  
where r i .... , u n) is a formula of L(Q) and m ~< n. The other claus- 
es in the definition are the familiar ones for L. 
It is easy to check, by induction on the complexity of ~p, that: 
Lemma 1.1. I f  all the free variables o f  r  ..., On) are among 
oil ..... Otm , and i f  air = biL .... ,aim = bim, then 
(gX, q) ~ ~[a i .... ,an] i f f  (91,q) ~ ~O[bl,...,bn]. 
Lemma 1.2. Let  (~,q)  be a weak model, let ~(xi, . . . ,Xm,Yl, ...,Yn) 
be a formula o f  L(Q), and fo rm ~ by replacing each free occur- 
rence o f  y 1, ...,Yn in ~ by constants c1 .... , c n. 1fall, . . .  , d n are the 
interpretations o f  ci,  ..., c n in 9I, then for  all ai, ..., a m E A,  
(91,q) ~ ~o[al,...,arn, d l , . . . ,d  n] i f f  (~t,q) ~ ~k[al,...,am]. 
Let 9/be a model for L. We shall write 9[ ~ ~[a i .... ,a n ] if and 
only if (~, q) ~ ~0[a 1..... a n ] where q is the set of all uncountable 
subsets of A. We shall say that 91 is a standard model of a sentence 
iff ~f P ~o in the above sense. Thus ~ is a standard model of ~o just 
in case ~0 holds in 9f with (Qx) interpreted by "there exist uncoun- 
tably many x". 
If ~o is a formula of L(Q) which has free variables Ul,... , un, then 
(9/, q) ~.~ means (9I, q) ~ (Vu 1 ... un)~ , 
and 
9 /~ means ~(Vu 1...u n )~.  
Let N(x) be a set of formulas cr(x) of L(Q), each having at most 
x free. We say that (9~, q) omits ~ iff there is no element a E A such 
that 
(~,q)  ~ o[a] for all oE ~ . 
The phrase "~C omits Z"  is defined similarly. 
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We shall now introduce a set of axioms for L(Q). The axioms we 
select will be simple schemes of formulas which are obviously true 
in all standard models. 
Axiom 0. All the axiom schemes for L, including identity axioms 
(e.g. as in [2, pp. 172, 281]. 
Axiom 1. N(Qx)(x - y v x --- z). 
Axiom 2. (Vx)(~o-* tp)~ ((Qx)~-,- (Qx)r where ~o, ~ are formulas 
of  L(Q). 
Axiom 3. (Qx)~o(x ...) ~-~ (Qy)~o(y ...), where ~o(x ...) is a formula o f  
L(Q) in which y does not occur, and ~o(y ...) is obtained 
by replacing each free occurrence of  x by y. 
Axiom 4. (Qy) (3x~ -~ (3x)(Qy)~o v (Qx)(3y)~o, where ~o is a for- 
mula of  L(Q). 
In each of the above axiom schemes, the formulas ~o and r may 
have free variables, and x, y, z are arbitrary distinct variables. 
The intuitive content of Axiom 1 is "Every set of power ~< 2 is 
countable". The content of Axiom 2 is: "Every set which has an 
uncountable subset is uncountable". Axiom 4 says "If Ux ~ xax is 
uncountable then either some a x is uncountable or X is uncount- 
able". This is equivalent to: "The union of countably many count- 
able sets is countable". 
Lemma 1.3. Every model ~ of  L is a standard model o f  every axiom 
of  L(Q). 
This lemma is straightforward and we may dispense with the 
proof. 
Notice that we have 9i N (Qx) (x -- x) if and only if the universe 
A is uncountable. We choose not to include the sentence (Qx) 
(x ~ x) in the list of  axioms and to allow countable standard mod- 
els. However, one could just as well include (Qx) (x ---- x) as an axiom 
of L(Q) and strengthen the definition of standard model by requir- 
ing A to be uncountable. 
w 1. The language L(Q) 7 
It is easy to find weak models which do not satisfy the axioms 
of L(Q). However, there are important examples of weak models 
other than the standard models which do satisfy the axioms of 
L(Q). For example, i fq  is the set of all infinite subsets of A then 
(9~, q) is clearly a weak model of every axiom of L(Q). 
The rules o f  inference of L(Q) are the same as for L, namely the 
rules: 
Modus ponens: From ~o, ~ ~ ~b infer ~. 
Generalization: From ~o, infer (Vx)~o. 
As usual, ~- ~o means that r is provable, and ~ ~- ~o means that ~ is 
deducible from a set I~ of sentences, in the language L(Q). To avoid 
complications we shall consider only deductions from sets of sen- 
tences ~, not from arbitrary formulas. We state two more easy 
lemmas. 
Lemma 1.4. Let (9I, q) be a weak model, o f  all the axioms of  L(Q). 
If[--~o, then (91,q) ~ ~o. l fZ  b-~oand (2I,q)isa wealcmodel ofN,  
then (91, q) ~ ~. 
Lemma 1.5. I f  F, is a set o f  sentences of  L(Q) and F, has a standard 
model, then Z is consistent in L(Q). I f  91 is a standard model of  Y_, 
and E b ~, then ~o holds in ~. 
Remark. In proving the above lemma, the only place where the 
axiom of choice is used is in showing that Axiom 4 holds in all 
standard models. Without the axiom of choice, there are several 
reasonable ways to define "x is uncountable", for example: 
Not [x l~< r ; 
r Lxl ; 
r Ix l ;  
There is a function on x onto r 1. 
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Each of these leads to a different notion of standard rhode1. In 
each case, if we assume that Axiom 4 holds in all standard models, 
then Lemma 1.5 holds. 
Many theorem schemes of the predicate logic can also be proved 
in the same way for L(Q), because of Axiom 0; for example, the 
scheme 
t-- Vx r  3x  ~ . 
We shall freely use these results from formal predicate logic without 
explicit mention. We shall also carry over to L(Q) some standard 
notions from predicate logic, such as the notion of consistency, 
without writing out the obvious definitions. In the following lem- 
mas we shall state some elementary proof-theoretic results about 
L(Q). 
l_emma 1.6 (Deduction theorem). Let  )2 be a set of  sentences o f  
L(Q) and ~ a sentence of L(Q). I f  Y, u (~} ~- ~ then Y, p ~-+ ~. 
Lemma 1.7. Let ~ be a maximal consistent set o f  sentences o f  
L(Q). Then for all sentences ~, ~ o f  L(Q), we have 
and 
C A ~ ~ ~ i f f  ~ E ~, and ~ E ~ . 
Lemma 1.8. Let L' be an extension o f  L formed by adding to L an 
arbitrary set o f  new individual constants. Then for  any set ~ o f  
sentences ofL(Q), ~ is consistent in L(Q) i f  and only i f  Y, is con- 
sistent in L'(Q). 
The proofs of the above three lemmas are the same as the proofs 
of the corresponding results for first-order logic. The next lemmas 
shows that certain particular formulas are provable in L(Q). 
Lemma 1.9. Let % ~ be formulas, and x, y be distinct variables, o f  
L(Q). 
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(i) ~- (Qx)~o-~ (3x)~o. 
(ii) ~- (3x)(Qy)~o-~ (Q.y)(3x)~o. 
(iii) I f  x does not occur free in ~o, then ~- (Qx) (~o ^  ~)-+ ~o A(Qx) ~O. 
(iv) p (Qx)(tpv ~b) ~ (Qx)~o v (Qx) ~0. 
(v) t- (Qx)~o A 7(Qx)  ~0 -+ (Qx)(~0 ATe).  
Proof: (i) Let y, z not occur in ~o. By predicate logic, 
}- 7 (3 x)~p -+ (VX) (~o -+ (x -=y v x =-- z)) . 
By Axiom 2 and propositional logic, 
[- 7(3x)~o-+ [(Qx)~o ~ (Ox)(x=-y vx---z)] . 
Using Axiom 1, 
p 7(3x)~o -~ 7 (Qx)~o, 
and (i) follows by propositional logic. 
The proofs of  (ii) and (iii) are easy. (ii) uses only predicate logic 
and Axiom 2, while (iii) uses only the result of (i) and Axiom 2 
plus predicate logic. The proof of (iv) is harder and is given below. 
Intuitively, (iv) says that "the union of two countable sets is count- 
able". Thus one would expect it to follow from Axiom 4 (the 
union of countably many sets is countable), and Axiom 1 (two is 
countable). Many readers will perhaps prefer to add (iv) as another 
axiom of L(Q) and skip the proof  of (iv). Indeed, we first proved 
the completeness theorem for L(Q) with (iv) included as another 
axiom. The author is indebted to R.Harrop for suggesting that (iv) 
might follow from the other (present) axioms. 
(iv) We have 
p (vx ) (~ -~ ~ v qJ), 
so by Axiom 2, 
l- (Qx)~o ~ (Qx)(~o v ~) .  
10 
Similarly, 
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P (Qx) tp -+ (Qx) (~pv4) ,  
whence 
(3) t-- (Qx)~o v (Qx)q2 --* (Qx)(~o v qJ). 
We now establish the converse of  (3). Let y, Yl, Y2 be distinct 
variables which do not occur in ~0 v r  and let 
0 = [ (yEy lACp)  V 0,'~Y2A @)]. 
Then by predicate logic, 
P (Vx).(~ v r ~ (~y)O).  
By Axiom 2, 
(4) ~- (Qx)(~o v 4) -~ (Qx)(3y)O.  
Then using Axiom 4, 
(5) P (Qx)(3y)O -+ 
We have 
(::ty)(Qx)O v (Qy) (3x)0 .  
p 0 -~ y -Y lvy -y2 ,  
whence 
P (3x)O -+ y=-y lv  Y -Y2 ,  
and by Axiom 2, 
P (Qy)(3x)O -, (Qv)@ - y l  vy  - y2) .  
But the right side contradicts Axiom 1, so 
(6) ~- q (Qy) (3x)0 .  
From (5) and (6) we have 
(7) p (Qx)(3y)O -+ (3y)(Qx)O .
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We now consider two cases, namely (VYtY~)(Yl---Y2) and 
(3 y lY 2)(7Y 1 -- Y 2)- 
Case I: By predicate logic, 
(VYlY2)(Yl - Y2) k- (Vx) [(~ov 4) "+ x ~ Yl v x --- Y2] 9 
Using Axiom 2, 
(VylY2)(Yl---Y2) ~ (Qx)(~o v r -* (Qx) (x -y  1 v x =Y2), 
whence by Axiom 1, 
(8) (VYlY2)(Yl =- Y2) P 7(Qx) (~0 v 4)-  
It follows from (3) and (8) that the formula (iv) is deducible from 
(VY lY2) (Yl = Y2)" 
Case II: We have 
p 7y  - Y l  ~ (Vx) (o  ~ 4) ,  
whence by Axiom 2, 
}- 7y  ~ Yl -+ ((Qx)0 -~ (Qx)~b). 
Similarly, 
Thus 
p 7y  --- y2 -~ ((Qx)0 -, (Ox)~o). 
}- 7y  =- Yl v 7y  ~- Y2 -~ ((Qx)0 -~ (Qx)~o v (Qx)~). 
Hence by predicate logic, 
[- (7Y1-= Y2) ~ [ (3y) (Qx)O ~ (Qx)~o v (Qx)4].  
Now using (3), (4) and (7), it follows that 
P- (TYl= Y2) -~ [(Qx)(~v ~) ~ (Qx)~o v (Qx)4],  
whence (iv) is deducible from ( ]y lY2)TY1  = Y2. 
(v) We have 
p (Vx)[~-~ 4 VgOA74)], 
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whence by Axiom 2, 
I- (Qx)~ 
By (iv), 
(Qx)(~ v (~ A n~)). 
P (Qx)(~V(~A'q~)) -~ (Qx)~v(Qx) (~An~) .  
Now (v) follows from the above two formulas by propositional 
logic. -~ 
Note that (iv) shows that (Qx) behaves like an existential quan- 
tifier. 
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w The completeness theorem for L(Q) 
We shall prove the following: 
Completeness theorem for L(Q). Let Z be a set of sentences of 
L(Q), then F, has a standard model if  and only if F, is consistent in
L(Q). 
As we mentioned before, this theorem is a conjecture of Craig 
and Fuhrken. One direction is elementary and was stated in Lem- 
ma 1.5 above. In this section we shall prove the hard direction: If 
2~ is consistent in L(Q) then l~ has a standard model. The proof 
will be in two stages. The first stage, Lemma 2.2-2.4,  uses Hen- 
kin's method of constructing models to show that 2~ has a weak 
model in which certain types can be omitted. In the second stage, 
from 2.5 on, we construct a standard model of 12 from an elemen- 
tary chain of weak models; the argument in this stage uses meth- 
ods of Tarski-Vaught [30] and our earlier paper [ 16]. Axioms 1 
and 4 are needed only for the second stage. 
Definition (tlenkin [ 11 ]). Let F be a set of sentences of  L(Q) and 
Ca set of  constant symbols of  L. C is said to be a set of witnesses 
for P ill for every sentence of the form (~x)r there exists c~ C 
such that 
I' ~ (3x)~o(x)-* ~o(c). 
Lemma 2.2. Let P be a maximal consistent set of sentences of L(Q) 
and let C be a set of  witnesses for P. Then r has a weak model 
(9, q) such that every element of  A is the interpretation of some 
eEC. 
Proof: Let Po be the set of all sentences of L which belong to P. 
Then by Lemma 1.7, P0 is maximal consistent in the sense of L. 
Moreover, C is a set of witnesses for I" 0 in the sense of L. It follows 
from Henkin [ 1 1 ] that P0 has a model 9I such that every element 
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of A is the interpretation of some c E C. Let ~- be the interpretation 
of c ~ C, whence A = {g: c ~ C}. We must make ~1[ into a weak model 
('~I, q) of P. For each formula ~o(x) of L(Q) with only one free varia- 
ble x, let 
S~ --- (~: c~ C and P t-- ~0(c)}. 
We then define 
q = {S~: ~0 has only one free variable, say x, and P I- (Qx)v~}. 
Then q is a set of subsets ofA. We shall show by induction on ~o 
that for all sentences ~0 of L(Q), 
(1) (g/,q) ~o  iff P~-~o. 
If ~o is an atomic sentence then (1) holds because ~o belongs to L. 
If (1) holds for ~o and qJ, then it holds for N~0 and for ~o ^  q; by Lem- 
ma 1.7. If ~o is (3x)qx(x) and (1) holds for all sentences q;(c), then 
one can show as in [ 11 ] that (1) holds for ~o, using the hypothesis 
that C is a set of witnesses for P. 
Let ~o be (Qx) ~D(x) and assume that (1) holds for all sentences 
t~(c), c~ C. Then 
(2) S, ={~: P~ qJ(c)} =(~: (~,q) ~ q;(c)} =(~: (~l,q) ~ ~[cl}, 
by Lemma 1.2. If P ~- (Qx) ~, then S~ E q by the definition of q, so 
(gf,q) ~ (Qx)qJ by (2). 
Assume (gd, q) ~ (Qx)~. Then Su~ ~ q by (2). From the defini- 
tion of q, there is a formula 0(y) such that SV, =S o and P ~- (Qy)0(y). 
By (2) and Lemma 1.2, 
~E S~ implies P J- ~(c), for all c ~ C, 
and similarly for 0. It follows that 
F P if(c) iff P ~- O(c), for all c ~ C. 
Thus 
P ~ r ~ O(c), allc a C. 
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Let u be a variable occurring in neither ~ nor 0. Then since C is a 
set of witnesses for P, 
12 ~ (Vu) (~(u)~ O(u)). 
Using Axiom 2, 
P k (Qu)•(u)*-* (Qu)O(u). 
But by Axiom 3, 
P t- (Qx) ~(x) ~ (Qu) ~(u),  
P ~- (Qy) 0(y)~-~ (Qu) O(u). 
Hence by propositional logic, 
P D (Qx)~(x)~ (Qy)0(y) ,  
and since P ~- (Qy)O(y), we have F ~- (Qx)$(x). This shows that 
(Qx)$(x) =~p satisfies (1). It follows from (1) that (g& q) is a model 
of P. -I 
Lemma 2.3 (Weak completeness theorem). Let E be a set of sen- 
tences of L(Q). Then F is consistent if and only if 2 has a count- 
able weak model in which all the axioms of L(Q) hold. 
Proof: The proof is essentially the same as Henkin's proof of the 
completeness theorem for first-order logic. First assume N is con- 
sistent. Enlarge the language L to L* by adding a countable set C 
of new individual constants. By Lemma 1.8, N is still consistent in 
L*(Q). By the method of Henkin, I~ can be extended to a maximal 
consistent set 12 of sentences of L*(Q) such that C is a set of wit- 
nesses for 12. Hence by Lemma 2.2, 12 has a weak model (91",q) in 
which every element is an interpretation of some c ~ C. Since C is 
countable, 91" is countable. Since P is maximal consistent in L*(Q), 
all axioms of L*(Q) belong to I" and thus hold in (~[*,q). Let 91 be 
the reduct of 9i* to L. Then (~1~, q) is the required countable weak 
model of I~ satisfying all the axioms of L(Q). 
The converse follows at once from Lemma 1.4. -I 
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The above result also holds for uncountable L if the word "count- 
able" is deleted. 
Lemma 2.4 (Omitting types). Let Y, be a consistent set o f  sentences 
of L(Q), and for each n < co let Y,n(Xn) be a set o f  formulas of  L(Q) 
(with only x n free). Assume that for every n < co and every formula 
~o(x n) of  L(Q), i f  (3Xn)~O is consistent with F then there exists ae  En 
such that (3Xn)(~o^-lo) is consistent with F. Then f' has a count- 
able weak model (~, q) which omits each Y'n" 
This lemma is the generalization to L(Q) of a standard result of 
Henkin [12] and Orey [26] for L. Note that the sets Zn are not 
necessarily all different. Our blanket assumption that L has only 
countably many symbols is essential here. The proof is the same as 
for first-order logic. It suffices to enlarge the language L to L* by 
adding a countable set C of new individual constants, then using 
Lemma 1.8, extend r to a maximal consistent set of sentences 1-'* 
in L*(Q) such that: (1) C is a set of witnesses for F*; (2) for each 
c ~ C and n < co there exists a ~ E n such that F* K --lo(c). Thence 
the desired result follows from Lemma 2.2. 
We next consider elementary chains of weak models. 
Definition (Tarski and Vaught [30] ). (~, r) is said to be an elemen- 
tary extension o f  (gY, q), in symbols (2[, q)-< (2~, r), i f f  A c B and 
for all formulas r .... ,x n) of  L(Q) and all a 1 .... ,a n E A, we have 
(gI,q) ~ ~P[al, ...,an] i f f  (23,r) ~ r ...,an]. 
A sequence (g[a, q,~), ~ <~', of  weak models is said to be an elemen- 
taly chain iff  we have (~ia, qa) .< (~,  q~) for all a < 13 < 7. 
The union of  an elementary chain (~Ia, qa), a < % is the weak 
model 
(~,q) = U~<, r (9~,q~) 
such that 9j = Ua<-] 9Je, and 
q = {S c A" For SOme (J < ,r, (3 <~ a < ~[ implies S (~ Ao~ E q~ }. 
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That is, q is the set of aI1Sc A such that So  A a is eventually in qa. 
The next lemma is the generalization to L(Q) of a theorem in 
[30]. 
Lemma 2.5. Let  (9.la, q~) , a< % be an elementary chain and let 
(9I, q) be the union. Then for all a < -/, 
(9.Ia, qc~) < (~, q) 9 
Proof: We show by induction on the complexity of ~o(xl, ...,Xn) that 
(1) For all a< ~, and all a 1 ..... a n ~ As ,  
(gXa, qa) P ~o[al,...,an] iff (9~,q) ~ ~o[al,...,an]. 
The steps of the induction for atomic formulas, and for connec- 
tives and quantifiers of L are the same as in [30]. We give the de- 
tails only for the case where ~o is of the form (Qx)~b, assuming that 
(1) holds for ~b. 
Assume a<~/and a1 ..... an~Ac~, and let 
S={a~A:  (~[,q) ~ ~b[a,a 1..... an]} . 
Let 
(9~,q) h (Ox) ~[at,  ...,an]. 
Then SE q, hence for some 13, a ~/3< 7 and Sn  A/3~ q~. Since (1) 
holds for ~, 
S n A~ = (a ~ A~: (Tr~,q~) ~ tp[a,a 1 ..... a~]}. 
Whence 
(~t~,q~) ~ (Qx) r  1 ..... a,,] 
and since (~o~, qa) "< (~,  q13), 
(91a,qc~) ~ (Qx) ~[a 1 ..... an]. 
Now suppose 
(~,q) ~ -I (Qx)~[a~ ..... a.].  
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Then S ~ q, so there exists ~ such that a ~< 13 < "r and S n A {3 q~ qt3" 
Arguing as before, we have 
(~a,qa) ~ - l (Qx)~[a 1..... an]. 
This shows that ~0 = (Qx)r satisfies (1). -I 
When dealing with elementary extensions, we often expand a 
model by adding a constant o L for each element. Given a model 
9I for L, we denote by ~* the model obtained by adding a new 
constant c a to L for each a E A and interpreting c a in 91" by a. It 
follows at once from Lemma 1.2 that if (91, q)< (~, r) and N' is 
obtained from N by adding a constant for each a ~ A, then 
(91',q) < (~', r). Furthermore, also by Lemma 1.2, if (~', r) is any 
model of the complete theory of (9I*, q) and each constant has the 
same interpretation i  ~' as in 9~*, then (~Y, r) is an elementary 
extension of (9~*, q). The following technical fact is needed later. 
Lemma 2.6. Let (91,q) be a weak model for L(Q) and let L* be the 
language o f  91". I f  (9I, q) satisfies all the axioms o f  L(Q), then 
(gA*,q) satisfies all the axioms of  L*(Q). 
Proof: Let ~o be any axiom of L*(Q). Let ca1 , .... Can be all the con- 
stant symbols of L* -L  which occur in ~o. Choose variables 01, ... , v n 
which do not occur in ~o, and form qJ by replacing each occurrence 
of Cam in ~o by o m (1 ~< m ~< n). Then, looking at the axioms, we see 
that ~b is an axiom of L(Q). Therefore qJ holds in (91; q), hence 
Vo 1 ...On~ holds in (91, q). It follows that 
(91",q) N ~[al  ..... an], 
and by Lemma 1.2, ~ holds in (9.t*, q). -t 
We now prove our main lemma, which says that every countable 
weak model of all the axioms of L(Q) has an elementary extension 
in which a given definable set in q gets new elements, and every 
definable set which is not in q stays the same. This lemma is the 
first place where we use Axioms 1 and 4 (or Lemma 1.9). 
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Lemma 2.7 (Main lemma). Let (9i, q) be a countable weak model 
in which all the axioms of L(Q)hold, let L* be the language of ~*, 
and let ~o(x ) be a formula of  L*(Q) such that 
(91", q) ~ (Qx)~o(x). 
Then there is a countable lementary extension 03, r)of (~[,q) such 
that: 
(i) For some b E B -A ,  (23*, r) ~ ~o[b ]. 
(ii) For every formula ~(y) of L*(Q) such that (9i*,q) ~ 7 (Qy) ~(y), 
we have 
{a~B: (N*,r) N r c A . 
Proof: Extend L* to L' by adding a new constant c. Let 1-' be the 
following set of sentences of L'(Q): 
(a) All sentences of L*(Q) true in (91",q). 
(b) ~o(c). 
(c) 7 ~(e), for every ~(y) in L*(Q) such that (~*, q) P 7 (Oy)qJ(y). 
We begin with a criterion for a sentence of L'(Q) to be consistent 
with P. We claim that: 
(1) A sentence O(c) is consistent with P if and only if 
(9i*, q) P (Qu)(O(u) ^ ~o(u)). 
Here 0(c) is understood to come from a formula 0(y) of L*, and u 
does not occur in 0(y) or ~o(x). 
To prove one direction of (1), assume that 7(Qu)(O(u) ^ ~o(u)) 
holds in (9/*, q). Then 7(0(c)^ ~o(c)) is of type (c) and thus belongs 
to 1-7 Hence P ~- 70(c), whence O(c) is not consistent with r. 
Now assume that 0(e) is not consistent with P. By the deduction 
theorem, 
P ~ 70(c) .  
Then there is a finite P0 c P such that 
Po P 78(c). 
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Let F 1 be the set of all sentences of type (a), and let --1 ~1(c), ..., 
-1 ~bn(c ) be the sentences of type (c) which belong to l" 0. We may 
assume n> 0. Then 
~1 U {tO(C),-] ~l(C), .... "-]~/n(C)} t" - lO(c ) .  
By the deduction theorem and propositional logic, 
I-a1 ~- (~0(C)A O(c)"* q/l(C)V ...V ~)n(C)) . 
Choose a variable u which does not occur in the sentence on the 
right. Then since c does not occur in 1"1, 
Pl  P ~o(u) ^O(u) -* ~1(u) v ... v r . 
Hence 
r l  P (Vu)(~o(u)^O(u)-+ qJl(U)V...v qJn(u)). 
By Axiom 2, 
P P- (Qu)(~o(u) ^ O(u)) ~ (Qu)(~l(u)  v ... v ~n(U)).  
But by Axiom 3 and since the sentences qJi(c) are of type (c), we 
have 
1-' 1 P- 7(Qu)(~/ i (u))  , 1 <~ i <~ n . 
Using Lemma 1.9 (iv), 
1-' 1 p q(Qu) (~ l (u )v  ... v ~n(u)) .  
Thus 
F 1 p- ~(Qu)(~o(u) ^0(u) ) .  
(9.I*, q) is a model of Pl,  by definition of Pz. Moreover, by Lemma 
2.6, (.~*,q) satisfies all the axioms of L*(Q). Hence by Lemma 1.4, 
(gj*, q) ~ G (Qu)(~(u) ^ O(u)).  
This proves the claim (1). 
We now claim 
(2) F is consistent. 
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To see this, consider the valid sentence c = c. We have by hypo- 
thesis, 
(9/*, q) ~ (Qx)~o(x), 
hence by Axiom 3, 
(9~*, q) ~ (Qu)~(u) ,
and using Axiom 2 and predicate logic, 
(9.(*, q) ~ (Qu)(~0(u) ^u -  u) . 
It then follows from (1) that the sentence c - c is consistent with 
P, and therefore 1-" itself is consistent. 
We now prepare to use Lemma 2.4. Since the set A is countable, 
the language of  (9.I:*, q) has only countably many formulas. We may 
then arrange all the formulas qJ(y) of L*(Q) such that 
(9~*,q) ~ 7(Q.v)~fy)  
in a countable list ~0(Y0), qJl(Yl), ... 9 (These are precisely the for- 
mulas qJ(y) such that ~(c) is in 1 ~ of type (c)). For each n < co, let 
~n be the set of  formulas 
I ;  n = {~n(y~)}  u {Tyn  - ca:  a E A}  
of L*(Q). We verify the hypotheses of Lemma 2.4 for the set of 
sentences F and the sets of formulas ~;n, n < co. We have already 
shown that P is consistent. Suppose O(YnC) is a formula of  L'(Q) 
such that (3Yn)O(y n C) is consistent with P. We must show that 
(3) There exists o ~ E n such that (:tyn)(O ^ - la) is consistent 
with I'. 
By (1), we have 
(9~*, q) N (Qu)(~0(u) ^(-qyn)O(YnU)). 
By Lemma 1.9(iv) (and Axiom 2), we have either 
(4) (~[*,q) N (Qu)[~o(u)A(3yn)(O(ynU)AOn(yn))] 
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or 
(5) (9~*,q) p (Qu)bp(u)A(:lyn)(O(ynu)A-ltl/nO, )) l .  
If (5) is the case, then by (1), 
(?y~)(O(y,, c) ^  7 ~n(Yn)) 
is consistent with F, and since t~n(Yn)E En, (3) holds. 
Suppose that (4) is the case. By predicate logic and Axiom 2, 
(~(*,q) N (Qu)(:Iyn)(~,O(U)AO(YnU)A ~n(Yn)) " 
Then by Axiom 4, we have either 
(~*, q) P (Qvn)(~ u)@(u)  ^  O(y~u) ^ ~n(Yn)) (5) 
or else 
(7) 
But 
(~[*,q) N (3Yn)(Qu)(~p(u)A O(YnU ) A ~n(Yn)) .
(9~*,q) e q(Qyn) qJnCVn), 
and hence by Axiom 2, (6) is impossible. Therefore (7) holds. Thus 
for some a E A, 
(9~*, q) N (Qu)(~(u) A O(CaU ) A ~n(Ca)) .
Whence by (1), O(caC)A ~n(Ca) is consistent with P, so O(cac) is 
consistent with P. It follows that 
(~y,)(O0, ,c)  ^  7-7y~ --- c a) 
is consistent with F, and since (Ty n - Ca)~ En, condition (3) holds. 
Having verified (3) in both cases, we may apply Lemma 2.4, and 
we get a countable weak model (23', r) of P which omits each type 
E n, n < ~o. We may assume without loss of generality that for each 
a E A, the constant ca is interpreted in ~3' by the element a. Let 23 
be the reduct of 23' to the language L. Then since (23', r) satisfies all 
sentences true in (9~*, q), we have 
(~I, q) -< (23, r) .  
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I f  b is the interpretation of the constant c in ~', then since (~', r) 
satisfies r
(~*,r)  ~ ~[b] . 
Also, by Axiom 1 we have for all a E A, 
(92", q) N -q(Qx)(x -= Ca VX-~ c a) 
whence the sentence 
7(c--- c, v c ---- c a) 
is of type (e) and belongs to P, hence holds in (~', r). It follows 
that b 4= a for all a E A, so 
b~B-A  . 
This shows that (~, r) satisfies conclusion (i) of the lemma. 
To verify conclusion (ii), let qJ(y) be any formula of L*(Q) such 
that 
(92",q) ~ 7(Qy)q4y). 
Then ~(y) is ~kn(Yn) for some n < w. The conclusion (ii) follows 
from the fact that (N', r) omits E n. -I 
By iterating the main lemma we get the following stronger result. 
Lemma 2.8. Let (92, q) be a countable weak model in which all 
the axioms of  L(Q) hold, and let L* be the language of  ~*. Then 
(~[, q) has a countable lementary extension (~3, r) such that for all 
formulas ~(x) ofL*(Q),  (~*,q) ~ (Qx)~(x) if and only if  there 
exists b ~ B - A such that (~*, r) ~ ~o[ b ]. 
Proof: We first dispose of the trivial case where (g[:, q) ~ --1 (Qx) 
(x -- x). In this case there are no formulas ~o(x) such that (91", q) p 
(Qx)~o(x), and we may take (~3, r) = (9/, q). 
Suppose (9~,q) ~ (Qx) (x -  x). Since the setA is countable, we 
may arrange air formutas ~o(x) of L*(Q), such that (Qx)r holds 
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in (9~*, q), in a countable list 
~0(x0), ~o1(xl), .... 
Then using Lemma 2.7 countably many times we construct an 
elementary chain 
(~t0,q0)-< (9/1, ql)  -< (912, q2) ... 
of length co such that: 
(1) (~to, q0) = (9/,q) ; 
(2) There exists b n E An+ 1 -A  n such that 
(9~n+l, qn+l) D ~On [bn ], n < co , 
(3) For all formulas $(y) of L*(Q) such that (9.I:*, q) 
q (Qy) tp(y), and all n < co, 
{a E An+l: (~[*+1, qn+l) ~ ~[a]} C A n . 
Let (~, r) = Un<~(9/n, qn)" Then by Lemma 2.5, (~, r) is an ele- 
mentary extension of each (9i.n, qn), and in particular of (9~ 0, qo) = 
(9/, q). It fol lows from this and from (1) - (3)  that (~, r) satisfies 
the conclusion of the lemma. -I 
Proof of the Completeness Theorem (Hard direction): Suppose s
is a consistent set of sentences of L(Q). By the weak completeness 
theorem 2.3, ~ has a countable weak model (~o, q0) in which all 
the axioms of L(Q) hold. Now iterate Lemma 2.8 w 1 times, using 
Lemma 2.5 at the limit stages. We then obtain an elementary chain 
(~a,  qa)  , ce < 601 , 
of countable weak models such that: 
(1) If c~ is a limit ordinal, (92a, qa) = U~<a(gd~, q~). 
(2) For any c~ < co I and any formula ~(x) of the language of (92~, qa), 
(gig, qa) ~ (Qx)~o(x) 
iff for some a EA~+ I -Aa ,  (9~+1, qa+l) ~ ~o[a] . 
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Let ~3 = U~<w,9~ a be the union of the elemental-y chain o f  g[a's. 
We shall show that 23 is a standard model of l~. 
Consider the weak model (23, r) = Ua<~, ~ (~Ia, qo~). By Lemma 2.5, 
(gI0,q0) <(~3,r), whence (~,r)  is a weak model of I~. So it suffices 
to prove: 
(3) For all formulas ~o(xl, ...,x n) of L(Q) and all b 1 .... , b n ~ B, 
(23,r) ~ ~o[bl, ...,bn] iff 23 ~ ~o[b 1..... b n ] . 
We prove (3) by induction on ~0. (3) holds trivially for atomic 
formulas % If (3) holds for ~ and 0, then it holds for (7 ~), ~ ^  0, 
and (3x)r  because the corresponding clauses of the satisfaction 
definition are the same for ~ as for (23,r). Assume that (3) holds 
for ~(x0, x 1 .... , xn) and let ~o = (Qx0)~0. Let b 1, ..., b n ~ B. For some 
c~< CO1, we have 
b 1, ..., bn E Ao~. 
Suppose 
(4) (~,r)  p (Qxo)~[bl ,  ...,bn]. 
Since (92[~, qo) -< (23, r) for all ~< COl, 
(9~,qo) ~ (Qxo)~O[bl,...,bn] , a <~ [3< COl 9 
By (2), whenever ~~</3< co 1 there exists ao~Ar -Ag  such that 
(g~O+l, qt~+l) ~ ~[ao, bx, "",bn], 
whence 
(23,r) ~ ~[a~,bl, . . . ,bn].  
All the a~'s are distinct and there are col of them, so the set 
S={boEB:  (~,r) k qJ[bo,bl,...,bn]} 
has power (.o 1. But since ~ satisfies (3), the set S is the same as 
{boEB: 23 ~ ~[b0,bl , . . . ,bn]},  
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and therefore 
~ (Qx0)~[bt ..... bn]. 
Now suppose that (4) is not the case. Then 
(2},r) P q(Qxo)~[bl ,  ...,bn]. 
Hence whenever a </~ < 6ol, 
(~[~,q~) ~ q(Qx0)~[bl ,  ...,bn]. 
It follows from (1) and (2) that 
S = {b0~B: (~,r) ~ ~[bo,bt , . . . ,bn] )c  A~ . 
But Aa is countable, so the set S is countable. Again using the 
assumption that (3) holds for 4, we conclude that 
not ~ ~ (Qx0)qJ[bl, ...,bn]. 
This completes the proof of (3). -I 
Note that in the degenerate case that $ [-q(Qx)(x---x), all weak 
models (~c~, qa) and (~, r) will coincide, and ~ will be a countable 
standard model of Z. The following corollary reformulates the 
completeness theorem for L(Q) with the added axiom (Qx)(x ~ x) 
and uncountable standard models. 
Corollary 2.9. Let ~, be a set o f  sentences of  L(Q). Then 
u {(Qx)(x--x)} is consistent in L(Q) if and only if~, has a stan- 
dard model o f  power co 1. 
A sentence ~o of L(Q) is said to be valid iff ~o holds in all standard 
models. 
Corollary 2.10. A sentence ~ of  L(Q) is provable if and only i f  it is 
valid. The set of  all valid sentences o f  L(Q) is recursively enumer- 
able in the set of  symbols of  L. 
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Corollary 2.11 (Compactness theorem). Let Z be a set of  sentences 
of L(Q). I f  every finite subset o f  2 has a standard model, then ~, 
has a standard model. 
The second part of Corollary 2.10, and Corollary 2.11, were first 
proved by other methods by Vaught [31 ] and Fuhrken [6], respec- 
tively. 
It is easy to see that both the completeness theorem and the com- 
pactness theorem for L(Q) become false if L has uncountably many 
constants. It suffices to consider the set 
= {7(Qx)P(x)} u {P(ce): ~< Wl} 
U {-ICoz ~- C#: a'<~< C01}. 
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w Applications of the completeness theorem for L(Q) 
In this section we shall present avariety of applications of the 
completeness theorem for L(Q). 
3.1. Each of the following schemes of formulas is easily seen to be 
valid in all standard models, and hence by the completeness theo- 
rem is provable in L(Q). In the list below, ~o and qJ denote arbitrary 
formulas for L(Q), and (S) is a string of 3 and Q quantifiers, i.e. (S) 
is of the form 
(Slxt)  ... (Snx n) , where S1,..., Sn ~ (3, Q}. 
(i) If no free variable of ~o ocdurs in S, 
p (s) (~o ^  qJ) ~ ~o ^  (s) ~ .  
(ii) p (s )@v ~) +-~ (S~v (s)qJ. 
(iii) If u does not occur in (S), then 
t- Ou) (S )~ (s) (3u)~ , 
~- (S)(~u)~o-~ (3u)(S)~o v (Qu)(~x 1 ... xn)~o. 
The above is a generalization of Axiom 4. Each of the formulas ( i ) -  
(iii) can also be shown directly to be provable in L(Q) without too 
much difficulty. One uses an induction on the length of (S). We shall 
need (i)-(iii) later in this paper. 
3.2. In [ 15 ] we gave a complete list of axioms for the class of all 
first-order models 9.I = (A, U, ... ) such that 
eo<~iUl< IAI. 
A typical consequence of these axioms is 
(By, t)(Vx, w)(3y,  z ) [7v -  t ^Tv-~ y/x (U(w)-. U(z)) 
^ (R(vxz) ~ R(tyw))] .  
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Each of the axioms from [ 15] holds in all standard models of 
(i) (Qx) (x=x)  A -](Qx)U(x) , 
so by the completeness theorem, each of them is formally deduci- 
ble from the sentence (i) in L(Q). 
3.3. Let a be an infinite cardinal and let r be a sentence of L(Q). 
We say that 9~ is a Qa-model of ~, 9~ ha r iff (9, q) is a weak mod- 
el of ~ where 
q={ScA:  ISl~>o~}. 
Thus ~ ha  r means that ~ holds in 9~ when (Qx) is interpreted by 
"there exist at least a x". The Q~-models o f r  are exactly the stan- 
dard models of ~o. ~ is said to be Q,v-valid iff every model ~ for L is 
a Qa-model of r 
Corollary 3.3.1. Let a be an infinite regular cardinal. Then: 
(i) All the axioms o f  L(Q) are Qa.valid. 
(ii) I f  a set )2 o f  sentences of  L(Q) has a Qa-model, then ~2 has a 
standard model (i. e. a Q~l-model). 
(iii) l f  a sentence ~o o f  L(Q) is Qo~ -valid then it is Qa-valid. 
Part (i) is elementary, and parts (ii) and (iii) follow from the 
completeness theorem. Fuhrken [7] first proved the above corol- 
lary by other methods, using a result of Vaught. 
Actually, Fuhrken [ 7] has shown using a result of Chang that if 
the Generalized Continuum Hypothesis (GCH) is assumed, then for 
every regular cardinal a, a set ~ of sentences of L(Q) has a Qa+- 
model if and only if it has a standard model. Thus under the GCH, 
our completeness theorem for L(Q) holds when (Qx) is interpreted 
by "there exist at least a + ", where a is a given regular cardinal. 
In the paper [ 1 7] we have shown the following for the quantifier 
Qa where a is singular and is a strong limit cardinal (i.e./3 < a implies 
2~< a). 
(i) If a and/3 are singular strong limit cardinals and ~ is a set of 
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sentences of L(Q), then ~ has a Qa-model if and only if l!~ has 
a Q0-model. 
(ii) If a is a singular strong limit cardinal, then the set of all Qa- 
valid sentences of L(Q) is recursively enumerable in L. 
(iii) If o is a singular strong limit cardinal and every finite subset of 
has a Qa-model, then ~ has a Q~-model. 
Moreover, the proof of (iii) implicitly gives a very complicated 
set of axioms for which the completeness theorem holds with Q 
interpreted by Qa. This leads at once to the problem of finding a 
simple complete set of axioms for L(Q) where Q is interpreted by 
Q~, a a singular strong limit cardinal. This is the analogue for Q~ 
of the problem solved in w 2 for Q,~1' 
In connection with this problem, it is clear that Axiom 4 is not 
Q~-valid. However, Axioms 0 -3  are Q~-valid, and so are various 
weak forms of Axiom 4, such as Lemma 1.9(iv) and the formaliza- 
tion of 
"If [x l<a  and [/ '[<a and lyil<~[x[ for all i~ / ,  
then I Ui~zxt l < e2'. 
One can readily write down a scheme with the intuitive content: 
"If Ix I< ~ then IS(x)l < ~". 
This scheme is Qa-valid but not Qo~s It is not clear whether 
anything more is needed to get a complete set of axioms for Qa. 
One can ask the same questions for Qu where ~ is strongly in- 
accessible and ~ > co. For this case even the analogues of (i)-(i i i) 
above are open. Fuhrken has proposed the following problem: Is a 
complete set of axioms for Qa with ~ > ~0 strongly inaccessible 
given by Axioms 0 -4  plus the scheme 
(Vx) [(3y)~a(xy... ) -+ 9 (Qz) (Vy) (~o(xy...) ~ ~o(zy... ))] 
-~ [ (Qx) (ny)~(xy  ...) -+ (Qx)(3x)~xy . . .)]  ? 
Intuitively, the above scheme says that if for each non-empty sub- 
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set 0 =~ J c  I we associate a set sj of power Iso-I < a, and if 
IU {sj: 0~dc I} l  ~> a ,  
then [II >1 a. This implies that if IS(/)I/> ~ then III ~ a. The scheme 
is clearly Qa-valid. 
Added in proof: This conjecture has been refuted by J.H.Schmerl, 
A.M.S. Notices 16, p. 843 (abstract), who shows that (i) fails. Par- 
tial results in the positive direction are announced by Schmerl and 
Shelah, ibid. p. 840. 
For more information on the problem for the quantifiers Qa, 
a ~ o31, see [ 17]. The analogous problems for various fragments of 
the language L(Q) are solved in [27], [34], [351. 
3.4. We may exploit the fact that both directions of the proof of 
the completeness theorem used only weak forms of the axiom of 
choice. The proof that 
E has a standard model ~, E is consistent in L(Q) 
used only the fact that 
"The union of countably many countable sets is count- 
able". 
The proof that 
E is consistent =~ E has a standard model 
used the axiom of choice only in the form 
C: "There exists a 3'unetion f with domain 6o 1 such that for 
each infinite ~ < 6ol, f(a ) is a function on w onto ~ ". 
For in the proof, we may use ordinals < 6o 1 for the new constants 
at each stage, and then ordinals < w 1 may be used in a canonical 
way to code formulas of the language, and also to code the elements 
of the models (9.i:a, q~). 
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In set theory without the axiom of choice, the class of cardinals 
is not well-ordered by the relation <. For this reason it is convenient 
to generalize the notion of a regular cardinal to that of a regular 
class of cardinals: 
Definition: A class X o f  cardinals is said to be regular i f f  whenever 
IUi~iSil >1 lalfor some lal E X,  
either 
or else 
III ;~ Ib l forsome Ibl ~X,  
ISil >t Iblfor some i~ I  and Ibl~ X .  
A cardinal la]is said to be regular i f f the class {la I} is regular. This 
coincides with the usual definition tinder the axiom of choice. 
Several interesting classes of cardinals can be proved to be regu- 
lar without the axiom of choice. For example: 
(i) The class of  all cardinals la I, such that not lal < o~, is regular. 
(ii) Let WO be the class of  all sets which can be well-ordered, and 
let WO" be the least class Y such that 
WOc Y 
and 
IEWOand {Si: iE I )  c Y implies Ui~IS i E Y. 
Then the class of  all cardinals lal such that a~ WO" is regular. 
Proof of (ii): Let WO O =WO, WO a+l ={[-JtEISi : [E  WO, 
{Si: i~ l )c  WOa), WO a = U~<aWOa for a a limit ordinal. Then 
WO" = UaWO ~. It is easily seen by induction on a that if x ~ WO a 
and ly I ~< x then y ~ WO'. Thus to prove that WO | is regular, it 
suffices to show that: 
(1) If I ~ WO" and {Si: i ~ I)  c WO', then 13ielS i E WO'. 
We shall prove by induction on a that 
(2) I f I~  WO ~ and (Si: i~ I}  c WO', then Ui~zS i E WO**. 
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Then (1) will follow from (2). By definition of WO', (2) holds for 
a = 0. Assume that (2) holds for all a </3. Let I~  WO o and 
{Si: i~I} c WO ". We may assume further that Iq~ Ua<oWO ~, and 
that/~ = 3' + 1. Then 
I= Ui~:~ 
for some Je  WO and {T]: ]e J}  c WO ~. It follows that 
Uie lS  i = U]e jU ie r lS  i . 
Since (2) holds for a = % we have 
Uier/S l e WO" 
for each ] e o r. Therefore 
Uie lS  i E WO', 
and (2) holds. -[ 
The axiom of choice, of course, implies that (Yx)(x e WO). Thus 
the sentence (Vx)(x E WO *) can be thought of as a very weak form 
of the axiom of choice. It is not hard to see that the class WO" can 
be defined by a formula of ZF. Moreover, it can be proved in ZF 
that every axiom of ZF except he power set axiom holds relati- 
vized to WO ~. Furthermore, the power set axiom relativized to WO" 
is equivalent to the sentence (Yx)(x ~ WO"). We shall make use of 
the class WO" in 3.7 below. 
Let X be a class of cardinals and ~o a sentence of L(Q). 9/is said 
t o be a Qx-model of~o iff (9/, q) is a weak model o f~ where 
q={SCA: IS I~ lal for some [a leX} ; 
that is, ~0 holds in 9i with Q interpreted by 
"there exists ) la[ x, for some lal eX" .  
~o is Qx-valid iff every model 9I is a Qx-model of ~o. 
The following can be proved without he full axiom of choice. 
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Corollary 3.4.1. Assume the weak form C above o f  the axiom of  
choice. Then: 
(a) I f  Y, is a set o f  sentences of  L(Q), X is a regular class o f  cardi- 
nals, and Y, has a Qx-model, then ~, has a standard model  
(b) Every sentence of L(Q) which is Qw -valid is Qx-valid for  every 
regular class of  cardinals X. 
Proof: For every regular class X of cardinals, all the axioms of L(Q) 
are Qx-valid. The result now follows from the completeness 
theorem. -I
Note that axiom 4 is intimately related to the notion of a regular 
class of cardinals, and thus the particular axioms we have chosen 
are important for the above corollary. 
Let BG be Bernays-G6del set theory (without he axiom of 
choice); see [9]. We continue the assumption of the weak choice C 
used in Corollary 3.4. 
Corollary 3.4.2. (a) I f  ~o is a sentence of L(Q) and ~o is Qcol-valid, 
then 
BG + "601 iS regular" b- "~0 is Qwl-valid", 
BG t- " I f  X is a regular class of  cardinals then ~o is Qx- 
valid". 
(b) I f  ~o is a sentence of L(Q) and 
BG + V= L k "~o is Q~o~-valM", 
then 
BG + "601 is regular" k- "~o is Q,ol-valid", 
BG t-- " I f  X is a regular class of  cardinals then ~o is Qx- 
valid". 
Proof: (a) If ~0 is Qwl-valid, then by C, ~o is provable in L(Q). There- 
fore ~o has a finite formal proof in L(Q), and the desired result fol- 
lows. 
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(b) The hypotheses imply that 
BG + V = L [- "~o is provable in L(Q)". 
Since the notion of provability in L(Q) is arithrnetical, 
BG ~- "~o is provable in L(Q)", 
and the conclusion follows. -] 
3.5. By examining the proof of the completeness theorem for 
L(Q), we caa obtain the following improvement, which leads to 
applications of a different kind. 
Theorem 3.5.1. Let F be a consistent set of  sentences of  L(Q), and 
for each n < ~ let ~-'n(Yn) be a set of formulas uch that 
(i) For some a n ~ En, F ~- 7 (Qyn) % ; 
(ii) I f  (3yn)~O is consistent with F, then there exists oE Zn such 
that (3y n) (~o h 7 o) iS consistent with P. 
Then P has a standard model which omits each Y'n, n < r 
Proof: By Lemma 2.4, 1" has a countable weak model (gJ, q) which 
omits each Zn. From the proof of the completeness theorem it
follows that there is an elementary extension (~, r) >- (9~, q) such 
that 
(~,r) ~ ~o[b 1.... ,b,,] iff ~ ~ ~o[bl,...,b n] 
and for each formula r of the language of (~, q), (~i, q) 
7(Qx) r  and only of 
{aeB: (~3, r) ~ r c A. 
Thus ~ is a standard mode[ of P. Also, for all n < ~, (9~, q) 
~- 7 (QYn) On(.V.), SO 
{aeB: (~,r) ~ an[a] ) c A. 
Since On(Yn)e ~n, and no element of A satisfies E, in (9~, q), it fol- 
lows that (2~, r) omits Z n. Therefore ~ omits Z,,. 
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If we read "satisfiable in a standard model" for "consistent" in 
the above corollary, we get a form of the result which does not de- 
pend on the choice of axioms for L(Q), and indeed is purely model- 
theoretic. 
Corollary 3.5.2. Let (gY, q) be a countable weak model for L(Q), 
and suppose (gJ, q)has an elementary extension (~, r)such that for 
all formulas ~o(x) in the language of  (gk*,q), (~*, q) ~ (Qx)~o(x) if 
and only if there exists b ~ B - A such that (23",r) ~ ~0[b]. Then: 
(i) All the axioms of  L(Q) hold in (9~, q). 
(ii) (9~, q) has a standard elementary extension ~. 
(iii) Let l~l(Yl), Z2Cv 2) .... be sets of  formulas of  L(Q) such that 
for each n, (9~, q) omits Z n and there exists o n E Zn such that 
(9i, q) P ~(Qyn)an. Then ~ may be chosen so that ~ omits each ~'n. 
Proof: (i) Axioms 0 and 3 clearly hold in all weak models. Axiom 2 
holds because if
(%,q) ~ (Vx)(~o-+ if)/x (Qx)~o[al, ...,an], 
then there exists b E B - A such that 
whence 
(~3,r) ~ ~o[b,a 1.... ,an], (~,r) ~ qJ[b,a 1,...,an], 
(~,q) ~ (Qx) r 1, ...,an]. 
Axiom 4 holds because if
(9~,q) p (Qyl)(3y2)~o[ax, ...,an] , 
then there exists b I E B - A such that 
(~,r) ~ (3y2)~o[b 1, al, ...,an], 
whence for some b 2 ~ B, 
(~,r) ~ ~O[bl,b2,al, ...,a n ] ; 
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in case b2EA we have 
(91,q) ~ (3y2)(Qyl)~o[al, ...,an], 
and in case b2EB-A  we have 
(9~,q) ~ (Qy2)(3yl)~o[ax,...,an]. 
Axiom 1 can be easily checked in a similar way. 
(ii) Follows from (i) and the Completelless Theorem for L(Q), 
where 2 is the set of all sentences true in (9I*, q). 
(iii) Let 1' be the set of all sentences true in (9i*, q). Then by (i) 
P is consistent in L*(Q). The hypotheses of 3.5.1 hold, and the re- 
quired conclusion follows. -I 
Corollary 3.5.2 is related to the following open problem: 
Suppose ~ is a countable model for L, 2(x) is a set of  formulas 
of  L, and 91 omits )2. Suppose ~ has a proper elementary extension 
which omits 2. Does 92 have an uncountable lementary extension 
which omits 2? 
Let us give an application of 3.5.2 to first order logic. Consider 
a model ~ = (A, R .... ~ where R is a binary relation. We say that a 
model 23= (B, R', ...~ is an end extension of 91 iff 9i c 23, A ~ B, and 
for all a~A and a ~B -A  we have aR'b and not bR'A. 
Corollary 3.5.3. Let 91 = (A, R, ...) be a countable model such that 
R is binary. I f  92 has an elementary end extension, then 91 has an 
elementary end extension of  power r 1. 
Proof: Let 23 be an elementary and extension of ~. Let q be the 
set of all X c A which are co final in (A, R ), i.e. for all a ~ A there 
exists x ~ X such that aRx. Let r be the set of all sets Y c B cofinal 
in (B, R'). Then we have (92, q) -< (23, r), because in both models 
each formula (Qx)~0 is equivalent to (Vy)(3x)(yRx  ^  ~o), where y 
does not occur in ~o. From the assumption that 23 is an end exten- 
sion of 92, it follows that (9.1, q) and (23, r) satisfy the hypotheses of 
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Corollary 3.5.2. We may assume without loss of generality that 
every element a of A is the interpretation of a constant ca of L. 
For  each a ~ A,  let ~,a(X), 2~'a(X) be the sets of  formulas 
~a(x) = {xRca} U {Tx=--cb: bEA} 
)2'a(X ) = (TCaRX } t3 {Tx-- c b" bEA } . 
Then, since 2~ is an end extension of 92, we have 
(91,q) N 7(Qx) (xRca)  , (9~,q) ~ 7(Qx) (TcaRx) .  
(92, r) obviously omits each Za, 22'a. Hence by 3.5.2 (9.I, r) has a 
standard elementary extension ~ which omits each Za and l~ a. It 
follows that ~ is an end extension of 92. From the proof of the 
completeness theorem for L(Q) we see that ~ may be chosen of 
power 6o 1. -I 
An interesting instance of Corollary 3.5.3 is where 92 is a count- 
able model of Zermelo set theory and xRy means "the rank o fx  is 
~< the rank o fy" .  
3.6. Some of the results in [ 19] about elementary extensions of 
models of set theory can be obtained from Corollary 3.5.3. If 
<A, E> is a model of  ZF (Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory), then for all 
aEA let 
a E ={b ~A:  bEa}.  
Corollary 3.6.1 (Keisler-Morley [ 19]). Let <A, E> be a countable 
model o f  ZF. Then 
(a) There is an elementary extension <B, F> of  <A, E> o f  power 
601, such that for all a E A, a f c A. 
(b) Let  <A, E> ~ "c is a regular cardinal", in the sense o f  3.4 above. 
Then there is an elementary extension <B, F> of<A, E> such that for 
all a E A, 
<A,E> ~ (lal~>c) implies la~-I = e l  , 
w 3. Application of the completeness theorem for L (Q) 39 
and 
<A,E) Nq(lal>I c) implies a FC A . 
Proof: (a) Make <A, E) into a model of L(Q) as follows. For each 
formula ~o(x) of ( A, E)*, let 
S~ = {a ~ A : <A, E>* ~ ~o[a]}, 
and define 
q = {S~,: (A, E)* ~ q(3y)(Vx)(~o(x)-~x~y)}. 
Intuitively (Qx)~x)  means ~o defines a proper class. For each a ~ A 
let 
~a = {xEca} u (7(X-Cb): bEa}.  
It is easily checked, using the axiom of replacement, that ((A, E)*,q) 
is a weak model of all the axioms of L*(Q). Moreover, the hypo- 
theses of Theorem 3.5.1 hold for the complete theory P of the 
model ((A,E>*,q) and the sets )2a, aeA.  Hence P has a standard 
model ~* of power r 1 which omits each Z a. It follows that the 
reduct N of 23* to the language of (A, E) is isomorphic to an ele- 
mentax2r extension of (A, E> of the required kind. 
(b) The argument is similar but we let 
q = {S~: (A,E)* D (~y)[ ly I-- c v (Vx) (xey  -+ ~o(x))]), 
and we omit only the sets 2; a where 
(A,E> ~ 7(lal>~ c). -q 
The proof of (a) in [ 191 was different and led to a stronger 
result. 
Corollary 3.6.2. Let 2[ = (A, E, R ) be a countable model o f  Zermelo 
set theory with the extra function symbol R, plus an axiom which 
states that R is the rank function, i.e. 
(3u)[xeR(u)]  ^  [xeR(y)  
+-~ y is an ordinal ^  (3z) (ze  y A x c R(z))] .  
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Then the fol lowing are equivalent." 
(i) 9I is a model o f  ZF. 
(ii) There is a proper elementary extension 25 = (B, F, S) o f  92( such 
that for all a~A,  a f t  A. 
(iii) There is an elementary extension 25 = (B, F, S) o f  power  oal, 
such that for all a ~ A, a F c A. 
Proof: The implication (i) =~ (iii) follows from Corollary 3.6. I, since 
the rank function R is definable in any model of ZF. It is trivial 
that (iii) ~, (ii). As.sume (ii). Suppose that r 1 ... Un)is a formula, 
al,...,~n E A, and 
(1) ~ ~ (Vx) (3  !y) ~o(xya 1 ... a n) . 
Let a E A. To prove that ~ is a model of ZF it suffices to prove: 
(2) 9,I ~ (3z ) (Vxy) (x~a^~o(xya l . . .an) -~ y~ z ) .  
Let b ~ B-A .  For some ordinal/3 of N, b FS(/3), whence/3 ~ B-A .  
Then for all a~ A, aFS([3). I f xFa ,  then x~ A, hence the unique 
y such that 
~ ~o(xya t... an ) 
belongs to A. Therefore 
~ (Vxy) (x~ a A~o(xyal...an)-* y~ S(~)).  
Since gl -< ~, (2) follows. --t 
3.7. The result 3.5.1. has another application to models of  set theory  
in which the axiom of choice, and the weaker axiom (Vx)(x ~ WO| 
fail. The following result gives examples of well-founded models of  
ZF which are uncountable but have only countably many ordinals. 
Theorem 3.7.1. Let (A, E) be a countable model o f  ZF. Then (A, E)  
has an elementary extension (B,F) such that for  all ae  A, 
(i) (A ,E)  ~ (a~WO')  implies laFI = w 1 , 
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(see 3.4 (i i)for the definition of  WO~), and 
(ii) (A, E) N (a ~ WO') implies a F C A. 
Moreover, for all b ~ B, 
(iii) (B, F) ~ "b is an ordinal" implies b ~ A. 
In particular, if (A, E) is well-founded, so is (B, F). 
Proof: We first note that "x E WO "'' can be expressed by a formula 
of ZF; first one defines its restriction to R(~) for each c~, and then 
one takes the union over a. Make (A, E) into a model of L(Q) by 
defining 
q = {S~o: CA, E)* N (3y)[y ~ WO | ^ (Vx)(x ~ y ~ ~o(x))]}, 
that is, (Qx)~o means that the class ~0 has a subset which is not in 
WO | For each formula ~0(x) in the language of (A, E)*, let ~ be 
the set 
l~  = (~o(x)} U {~(x-Cb):  (A, E>* ~ ~P(Cb)). 
We have shown in 3.4(ii) that the class of all cardinals Ix I, xE WO ~, 
is regular, and it follows that ((A, E)*, q) satisfies Axiom 4 of L*(Q). 
It obviously satisfies Axiom 1, since all finite sets belong to WO, 
and Axioms 2 and 3. Let P be the complete theory of ((A, E)*,q). 
Then the hypotheses of Theorem 3.5.1 are satisfied by P and by 
the sets of formulas 
(l) 2;~, where (A, E) ~ ~(Qx)~(x) .  
Hence P has a standard model ~* which omits all the sets X~, in (1). 
As before, the reduct ~3 = (B, F> of ~* may be taken to be an ele- 
mentary extension of (A, E). (B, F) has the property that for all 
formulas ~o(x) of  ((A, E)*, q), 
(C4,E)*,q) ~ (Qx)9 implies I(b ~ B: (B, F)* ~ ~o[b]}[ =wl ,  
((A, E)*,q) N 7 (Qx)9 implies (b E B : (B, F)* N ~0[b ]) c A. 
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Hence (i) holds. It is not hard to see that i fx ~ WO | and y c x then 
ye  WO', whence (ii) holds. Since ((A, E),q) ~ 7(Qx) (x is an or- 
dinal), (B, F) has the same ordinals as (A, E). Thus (iii) holds. -t 
Cohen has proved, using the forcing construction, that if ZF has 
a countable well-founded model then it has a well-founded model 
of power co I with only countably many ordinals (unpublished). 
Theorem 3.7.1 has the following related corollary: 
Corollary 3.7.2. Every countable well-founded model ~ o f  
ZF + (3x)(x q~ WO') has a well-founded elementaly extension P3 of  
power w 1 such that 2t has the same ordinals as 9J. 
Since every well-founded model of ZF is isomorphic to a transi- 
tive e-model (i.e., a model (A, ~) where A = uA), we have 
Corollary 3.7.3. Let (A, E) be a countable transitive ~-model o f  
ZF+ (3x)(xq~ WO'). Then there is a transitive E-model (B, ~) of  
power 6o 1 and an elementary embedding f o f  (A, ~ into (B, E) 
such that f maps the ordinals o f  A onto the ordinals orB. 
In the above corollary, we do not know whether A can be a sub- 
set of B. 
It is known that if ZF has a countable well-founded model, then 
so does ZF + (3x)(x (~ WO| We shall now exploit two such exam- 
ples. 
3.8. Solovay [28] has shown, assuming that ZF + "3 an inaccessi- 
ble cardinal" has a countable well-founded model, then there is a 
cauntable welt-founded model 9d of  ZF such that in 9~, 
I. Every set o f  real numbers is Lebesque measurable and 
II. The axiom of  choice holds for countable families of  sets o f  real 
numbers. 
From I and II one can prove 
III. The set o f  real numbers q~ WO'. 
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Proof that ZF t- I A II--~ III: It is known that I and II imply (via 
Fubini's theorem) that the union of any well-orderable family of 
sets of reals of measure zero has measure zero. Also, every well- 
orderable set of reals is countable and thus has measure zero (cf. 
[241, [28]). Assume the set R of real numbers belongs to WO'. 
Then there is a least ordinal a such that some set x c R of measure 
> 0 belongs to WO a. (WO a is defined in the proof of 3.4(ii)). 
x ~ WO, so a > 0. But then x is the union of a well-orderable family 
Yi, i~ I  of setsYiE U~<~WO ~. Eachy i is a subset of R and thus has 
measure 0. This is a contradiction. Hence R ~ WO'. --t 
Corollary 3.8.1. Let <A, E> be a countable well-founded model of 
ZF plus I and II. Then <A, E> has a well-founded elementary exten- 
sion <B, F> which has the same ordinals as <A, E> but has w 1 real 
numbers. 
Thus, in a sense, big chunks of the real line have Lebesgue meas- 
ures. It is shown by Mycielski and Swierczkowski [25] and 
Mycielski [24] that I and II follow from the axiom of determinate- 
ness (AD). Thus if ZF + AD has a countable well-founded model, 
then it has a model with countably many ordinals and 6o I real num- 
bers. 
By using a direct argument instead of applying the completeness 
theorem for L(Q), we can prove a stronger form of the above corol- 
lary. For instance, if the continuum hypothesis holds then the 
model !8 can be chosen so that the unit interval of N has outer 
Lebesgue measure one in the real world. We shall give the proof of 
this stronger esult in another paper. 
The model constructed by Solovay [ 28] also satisfies the follow- 
ing sentence: 
I'. Every set of  real numbers has the property of Baire. 
A set X of reals is said to have the property of Baire if and only 
if there is an open set Y of reals such that the symmetric difference 
(X -  Y) u (Y -X)  
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is of first category, i.e., is a countable union of nowhere dense sets. 
K.Kunen has shown that in ZF one can prove that I' and II imply 
that the union of any well-orderable family of sets of real numbers 
of first category again has first category. Using the same argument 
that we used above, it follows that 
ZF ~- I' A II -+ III . 
This gives us 
Corollary 3.8.2. Let (A, E) be a countable well-founded model of  
ZF plus I' and II. Then (A, E~ has a well-founded elementary ex- 
tension (B, F) which has the same ordinals as (A, E) but has 031 
real numbers. 
By a direct argument one can improve this corollary too. For 
example, assuming the continuum hypothesis, N can be chosen so 
that its unit interval is not of first category in the real world. 
3.9. We now turn to a second example. A set a is said to be a 
Dedekind set iff 
n<la l  for a l ln<co ,  
but 
not co 4 lal.  
These are the sets which are Dedekind finite but not finite. 
Assuming that ZF has a countable well-founded model, Halpern 
and Lgvy [20], and later Mathias [21] have constructed countable 
well-founded models 9/of  ZF such that in 9.I, 
IV. There exists a Dedekind set which is a subset of  the set of  real 
numbers, 
and 
V. The axio.m of choice holds for countable families of  finite sets, 
(i.e., C w ). 
<co 
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Actually, Mathias shows that his model satisfies the axiom of 
choice for all well-ordered families. We are interested in the weak 
form V because it implies 
VI. I f  d is a Dedekind set then d ~ WO | 
Proof that V ~* VI. Assume V and suppose there is a Dedekind set 
de  WO'. Let a be the least ordinal such that some Dedekind set d 
belongs to WO a. Then a > 0 because d obviously is not well-order- 
able. Thus we have 
d = U/3<,y e~ 
where ~/is an ordinal and each e~E U6<~WO ~. Hence each eo is not 
Dedekind. We cannot have cod le#l because o c d and not co ~< Idl. 
Therefore ach e# is finite. For each ~< % let 
P 
e~ = e~ --  U~<~ e~ . 
Then the sets e~ are pairwise disjoint and 
I d = U#<,y e#. 
F Since d is not finite, infinitely many e 0 are non-empty. For n < co 
I 
let fn be the nth non-empty e~. Then 
Un<~fn C d,  
and the fn are finite, disjoint, and non-empty. By the axiom of 
choice C~_,o, there is a set g which meets each f ,  in exactly one 
point. Then [gl =co and gC d, so cod ld[, a contradiction. There- 
fore d r WO". -I 
Corollary 3.9. Let <A, E> be a countable well-founded model of  ZF 
in which V above holds. Then there is a well-founded elementary 
extension <B, F> >- (A, E> which has the same ordinals as <A, E> and 
such that for all d E B, 
(B, F> ~ "d is a Dedekind set" implies IdFI = co 1 . 
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This corollary sheds some light on the notion of a Dedekind set. 
Although they satisfy Dedekind's definition of finiteness, in the 
above model all Dedekind sets are extremely large, much larger 
than the class of all ordinals (as seen from outside the model). 
3.10. By w-logic, L ~, we mean the language foITned by adding to 
first-order logic L the new unary predicate symbol N and constant 
symbols 0, I, 2, .... These symbols are to be regarded in the same 
category as the identity symbol, and are given a fixed interpretation 
as follows. By an w-model we mean a model 9~ for L such that 
w c A. The symbol N is interpreted in 9~ by the set w of natural 
numbers, and the symbols 0, 1, ... by the corresponding elements of 
w. Then satisfaction of formulas in 9.I is defined in the usual way. 
Thus every w-model ~ satisfies the co-rule, i.e., 
If 9~ N ~0(0), 95 ~ ~o(1), ~[ ~ ~0(2), ... then 95 N (Vx)(N(x)-+~o(x)). 
Furthermore, every w-model omits the set 
(w) = {N(x), -Ix -- 0, -lx -- 1, -ix - 2, ...) . 
The language L~(Q) is formed by adding to L r176 the quantifier 
(Qx). This language is useful in studying the question of which 
theories in co-logic have uncountable models. (There ztre easy exam- 
ples of theories in L ~~ which have infinite models but no uncount- 
able models; e.g., the sentence (Vx)N(x)). 
The classical co-completeness theorem (Henkin [ 12], Orey [26]) 
is stated as follows. The language L `~ has all the axiom schemes and 
rules of inference of L, plus the additional axioms 
N(O),N(1),N(2), ... ; 
-10 -  1,-q0-- 2,-ql - 2 .... ; 
and the infinite rule of inference (the w-rule): 
(1) From~o(O),~o(1),~o(2),... infer (Vx)(N(x)-~o(x)). 
Deductions and proofs in L ~~ can be either finite or countable in 
length. 
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w-completeness Theorem. A set o f  sentences of  L ~~ is consistent if
and only if  it has an w-modeL 
Using Theorem 3.5.1, we can now give a similar completeness 
theorem for the language LW(Q). By a standard co-model of a set Z 
of sentences of L~(Q) we mean an w-model 9~ which satisfies all 
the sentences of Z when Q is interpreted as "there exist uncount- 
ably many", N is interpreted by w, and 0, 1 .... by the correspond- 
ing natural numbers. 
The axioms of LW(Q) are as follows: 
Axiom schemes 0-4  o f  L(Q); 
N(0), N(1 ), N(2) .... ; 
q0  = 1,--10 = 2,-'11 - 2,... ; 
-l(Qx )N(x ). 
The rules of inference of L~~ are: 
Modus ponens, 
Generalization, 
The co-rule (1) above. 
Corollary 3.10 (Completeness theorem for L'~ A set of  sen- 
tences o f  LW(Q) is consistent in LW(Q) if and only if it has a stan- 
dard co-model. 
Proof: Let P be the set of all consequences of Z in L~ Since Z 
is consistent in L'~(Q), P is consistent in L~'(Q). Moreover, any con- 
sequence of F in LW(Q) is already deducible from E, and thus already 
belongs to P. 
Let L' be the first-order logic obtained by addingN,0, 1,2 .... to 
L and treating them as ordinary predicate and constant symbols. 
Thus L'(Q) and L~~ have the same formulas, but L'(Q) has only 
the Axioms 1-4 and the first two rules of inference, and it admits 
arbitrary models instead of only w-models. Consider the type (w) 
given above. Since all the axioms stating that the natural numbers 
are distinct and belong to N are in U, it is obvious that any standard 
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model of P which omits (co) is isomorphic to a standard to-model 
ofF. 
We shall apply Theorem 3.5.1 to the sets F, (co) in the language 
L'(Q). Since the formula N(x) ~ (co) and the axiom ~(Qx)N(x) be- 
long to F, hypothesis (i) of 3.5 holds. Using the to-rule, it is a sim- 
ple matter to check that (ii) of 3.5.1 also holds, where "consistent" 
is understood in the sense of L'(Q). Thus by 3.5.1 P has a standard 
model which omits (to), and hence P has a standard to-model. -I 
3.1 1. Notice that if (Qx) is interpreted by "there exist infinitely 
many", then the axiom 7 (Qx)N(x) of L~~ is no longer valid. 
However, all the other axioms of LC~ are valid under this inter- 
pretation, and all the rules of inference preserve validity under the 
interpretation. It follows that the axiom 7 (Qx)N(x) cannot be 
proved from the other axioms. 
On the other hand, if ~ is a regular cardinal and a > 6o, then all 
the axioms of L~'(Q) are valid when (Qx) is interpreted by "there 
exist at least cd'. It follows that the results presented in 3.3 and 3.4 
carry over to the language LW(Q), with the single exception that 
they no longer hold for the cardinal to. Thus 
Corollary 3.11.1. Let a > to be a regular cardinal. I ra set )2 o f  sen- 
tences of  L~(Q) has a Qa-model which is an e-model, then ~ has a 
standard to-model. 
The two-cardinal theorem in [ 16] follows from this. 
Without assuming the axiom of choice we have: 
Corollary 3.11.2. Assume the weak choice ptqnciple C o f  3.4. I f  X 
is a regular class of  cardinals such that to ~ X, Y, is a set o f  sentences 
of L~~ and Y, has a Qx-model which is an to-model, then ~ has 
a standard to-model. 
Also, Corollary 3.4.2 holds for sentences ~0 of L~~ if "X is 
regular" is strengthened to "X is regular and to ~ X". 
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3.12. For the next two examples it is convenient to introduce sec- 
ond order logic (with identity). The individual variables will be 
denoted by x,y ..... the class variables by X, Y, ..., and the member- 
ship relation between them by E, as in x ~ X. For the examples we 
give, relation variables are unnecessary. We also have at most count- 
ably many relations, functions and constant symbols. A (Henkin) 
model for a second order logic L 2 is a structure 9/[ with a universe 
set A for the individuals, a universe set C, which is a collection of 
subsets of A, for the class variables, and interpretations for the non- 
logic symbols. - and E are interpreted in the natural ways. The 
axioms and rules for L 2 are those of [2 ], plus axioms of equality 
and the axiom of extensionality: 
(VX, Y) [X -  Y *-'~ (Vx) (xEX ~--~ xE  Y)]. 
Let us form the language L2(Q) by adding to L2 the quantifier 
(QX), applied only to class variables. The axioms of L2(Q) are all 
the axiom schemes of L 2, plus Axioms 1-4 in w 1 with the symbols 
x, y, z replaced by class variables X, Y, Z, and the additional axiom: 
Axiom 5. (QY)(3x)~o-~ (3x)(QY)~0. 
Our intent is to study only models with countably many individ- 
uals, and this is the reason for Axiom 5. By a standard model for a 
sentence ~o of L2(Q) we mean a model 9~ for L 2 such that A is 
countable and ~o holds in 9/[ when (QX) is interpreted as "there are 
uncountably many X". 
We have the following completeness theorems for L2(Q). The 
proofs are the same as the proof of the completeness theorem for 
L(Q) and Theorem 3.5.1, except for trivial changes. 
Theorem 3.12.1. A set P o f  sentences of  L2(Q) is consistent in 
L2(Q) i f  and only if F has a standard model. 
Theorem 3.12.2. Let F be a consistent set o f  sentences of  L2(Q). 
Let Co, cl, c2, ... be individual constants o fL  2 such that for any 
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formula ~o(x), i f  (3x)~o(x) is consistent with F then there is a c n 
such that ~o(c n) is consistent with F. Then F has a standard model 
9~ such that A =(a0,al ,  ...) where a n is the interpretation ore n. 
The above corresponds to a very special case of 3.5.1 which we 
shall use below. 
One can also readily extend the above theorems to the larger 
language obtained by applying the quantifier Q to individual as well 
as class variables, and allowing models with no restriction on the 
size of A. 
3.13. Second-order number theory is formulated in the second 
order logic L 2 with an individual constant 0, function symbols +, . ,  
and the successor function symbol s. 0, +, -, and s apply only to 
individuals. The axioms are: 
Peano's axioms, including the induction axiom: 
(YX)[0 ~X^ (Vy)(.v ~X~ syeX)  ~ (Yy)ye  X] .  
Comprehension scheme: 
(3X) (yy)  Cv ~ x ~ ~o), 
where ~o is any formula in which X does not occur. 
Choice scheme: 
('r ( 3 Y) ,,o(x, Y) ~ ( 3 Y) (Vx) ~o(x, Yx ) ,  
where ~0 possibly has other free variables, and ]Ix =(Y: 2x3y~ Y), 
with the obvious abbreviations. 
A model for second-order number theory is a structure 
~=(N,  C, 0,+, . , s )  
where the class variables range over C and the set variables range 
over N, and C c S(N). We always have 
(0 ,1 ,2  .... ) cN ,  
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where 1 = s(0), etc. g[ = <N, C, 0,+,. ,s) is said to be an co-model iff 
N = co and 0, +, -, s have the usual interpretations. We shall say that 
a set CC S(co) is an co-model iff (co, C, 0,+," ,s> is an ~-model. 
The following theorem answers a question of H.Friedman. It is 
an application of  3.12.2. 
Theorem 3.13. Let C be a countable co-model o f  second order num- 
ber theory. Then there is an co-model D o f  power IDI = co 1 which is 
an elementary extension o f  C. 
Proof: Let 9.I* be the co-model formed by adding a constant for 
each element of w and each element of C, and let L~ be the lan- 
guage of ~*. Let I; be the set of all sentences of L~ which hold in 
9~*. Now let 17' be the set of all consequences in L~(Q) of l~ plus 
the set of sentences 
(I) (QX)~o +-~ -1(3 U)(Vx)(~o-+ (3x)X  = Ux) , 
where U and y do not occur in ~o. Intuitively, (QX)~ says that the 
family {X: ~o(X)} is not covered by any enumerable family 
(U0, U1, U 2, ...}. It is clear that all uses of (QX) can be eliminated, 
so that 
(2) For every formula r of L~(Q), there is a formula 0 of L~ 
such that 0 +-~ ~ can be deduced from P without using 
Axioms 1-5,  and also 
(3) For any formula 0 of L~, E k- 0 if and only if 0 can be 
deduced from P without using Axioms 1-5.  
Thus to prove that I' is consistent in L~(Q), it suffices to show 
(4) Each instance of the Axioms 1-5 can be deduced from 
P without using Axioms 1-5.  
Using the comprehension axiom it is easy to deduce Axiom 1 
from 1-'. Axioms 2 and 3 follow trivially in view of the "definition" 
(1) of  (QX). In view of (2), it suffices to deduce Axioms 4 and 5 
when ~o is a formula of L~. 
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Axiom 4 may be rewritten 
7 (3X)(QY)~o ^  7 (QX) (3 Y)qo -* 7 (QY)(3X)~o. 
Using (1), this is equivalent with respect o F to a ^/3-+ 3', where 
= (VX) (3V) (VY) (~+ (3y) Y -  Vy) 
{J = (3U) (VX) ( (3Y)~ (3x) X--- U x) 
7 = (3 V')(VY)((3X),# -+ (3y)  Y=- Vy). 
Since a ^ /3-+ 3' is a formula of L~, we now need only prove that 
^/3 ~ 3  `is deducible from ~ in L~. 
Assume ,~ and/3. By ~, there is a U such that 
(VX, r )@(X,  Y)-+ (3x)X  =- Ux). 
Then 
(5) 
By a, 
(VIO((3X)9(X, Y) -+ (3x)~o(U x, Y)) .  
(Vx)O g) -, (3y)g-- vy). 
Using the choice scheme, there is a W such that 
(Vx)(V Y)@(Ux, Y) -~ (3y)Y- -  (Wx)y) , 
hence 
(VY)((3x) ~(Ux, Y) -~ (3x) (3y)  Y=- (Wx)y) . 
By comprehension, there is a V such that for all x and y, (Wx)y - 
W2xsy. Then 
(6) Y) + (3z) Y- -  gz )  . 
Now 3  `follows from (5) and (6). 
The proof of Axiom 5 from P is similar but easier. This estab- 
lishes (4) and we conclude that P is consistent in L*(Q). 
Let Co,C1, c 2 .... be the individual constants of L~ which denote 
0, 1,2, ... in 9/*. Suppose (3x)~o(x) is consistent with P. By (3) we 
may assume that ~o(x) is a formula of L~. Then (3x)~0(x) holds in 
9/*, hence, there is a c n such that ,p(c n) holds in 9/* and thus be- 
longs to Z. Then Z [- ~o(c n), hence ~o(c n) is consistent with F. 
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We have verified the hypotheses of Theorem 3.12.2. Therefore 
F has a standard model ~* in which all the individuals are inter- 
pretations of Co, cl,  c 2 . . . . .  The reduct of ~* is then ismorphic to 
an elementary extension D of C and D is an r Cantor's 
diagonal argument can be carried out in second order number 
theory to prove 
-7(3U)(VX)(3x)X--  Ux , 
and it follows that 
r ~- (QX) (X=X) .  
Therefore ~*,  and hence D, has power ~o 1. --t 
3.14. The results of 3.13 hold for a much wider class of theories in 
L 2. Suppose that a binary function symbol p is among the symbols 
of L2, which applies only to individuals. Let l"p be the theory of L 2 
with the following axioms: 
(i) (Vxlx2YlY2)(P(XlX2) =- P(Y lY2) -~ Xl - Yl ^ x2 -= Y2) 9 
(Intuitively, p is a one-one function. We may think of p as a "pair- 
ing function".) 
(ii) The comprehension scheme of  3.13. 
(iii) The choice scheme of  3.13, where Yx ={y: p(x,y)E Y}.  
Theorem 3.14. Let 91 be a countable model o f  Pp. Then 91 has an 
elementary extension .~ which has exactly the same individuals as 
9I but has a~ 1 classes. 
The proof is a straightforward generalization of the proof of 
Theorem 3.13. 
The above theorem also applies to any theory P of L 2 such that 
some inessential extension of F implies all the axioms of Pp where 
p is a new binary function symbol. That is, there exists a formula 
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~o(xyz) of L 2 such that 
r" ~- (Vxy) (3!z )~p(xyz)  , 
and all the axioms of I'p are consequences of
P U {(Vxyz) (p (xy)  =- z ~ ~o(xyz))} . 
Thus Theorem 3.14 applies to second order number theory, and to 
second order number theory with countably many extra predicate 
symbols, for we may take 
~o(xyz) = (z = 2x3 y) . 
Another example is second order ZF (with the comprehension and 
choice schemes), taking 
tp(xyz)  = (z = ~x,y)) .
3.15. There are other interpretations of the quantifier (Qx) and 
other choices of axioms in the language L(Q) for which we can 
prove a weak completeness theorem like 2.3. We give some examples 
here. Let P be a set of formulas of  L(Q). We shall say that a set 
of sentences of L(Q) is consistent relative to I? iff 2; is consistent 
in the formal system obtained from L(Q) by replacing Axioms 1 -4  
by P. The notion of a weak mode l  of N was defined in Sect ion 1. 
In the following we may drop the hypothesis that the language L
is countable. 
Theorem 3.1 5.1. The fo l lowing are equivalent: 
(i) 2; is consistent relative to Ax iom 3 and the scheme 
(Vx) (~o+--~ qJ) -* ((Qx)tp ~-~ (Qx)~) .  
(ii) 2; has a weak model.  
Theorem 3.15.2. The fo l lowing are equivalent: 
(i) 2; is consistent relative to Ax ioms 2, 3 and the scheme 
(Qx)(qgv r  +-~ (Qx)~o v (Qx)~O .
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(ii) 1~ has a weak model  (9~, q) such that S(A ) - q is an Meal over A. 
Theorem 3.15.3. The fol lowing are equivalent: 
(i) ~ is consistent relative to Axioms 2, 3, and the scheme 
(Qx)(r ~k) ~ (Qx)~ A (Qx)~.  
(ii) ~ has a weak model (9i, q) such that q is a filter over A. 
Theorem 3.15.4 (Slomson [271 ). The following are equivalent: 
(i) 2; is consistent relative to Ax ioms 2, 3 and the schemes 
(Qx) (~o A ~b) ~ (Qx)~o/x (Qx)~ ; 
(Qx)-qtp ~ --1 (Qx)~. 
(ii) I~ has a weak model (~, q)such that q is an ultrafilter over A. 
In each of the above theorems, the proof is to first construct a
countable weak model (~(, r) of N which satisfies the axioms given 
in part (i) by Henkin's construction, and then to extend r to a set q 
of the required kind. The proofs present no difficulties. Notice 
that Theorem 3.15.4 remains true if Axiom 1 is added to (i) and 
"ultrafilter" is changed to "noa-principal ultrafilter" in (ii); 
actually, Slomson [27 ] showed that one can replace "ultrafilter" 
by "uniform ultrafilter". A study of the model theory of the lan- 
guage of 3.15.4 is given in [27]. 
The interpretation of (Qx) as an ultrafilter in Theorem 3.15.4 
sheds some light o2a the following well-known result of Ehrenfeucht 
and Mostowski [ 5 ] : 
Let  Y, be a set o f  sentences o f  L and let Co, cl,  e2, ... be new in- 
dividual constan ts. I f  
~, U (-lCm=--Cp: re<p< a~} 
is consistent, then so is 
~, U {~(eml ... Cmn ) ~ ~O(epl ... Cpn): ~o(v 1 ... Un) 
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is a formula  o f  L and 
ml< . . .<ran ,  Pl < " "<Pn}"  
The original proof in [5] used Ramsey's theorem, and Gaifman 
[8] gave a new proof using iterated ultraproducts. Using the lan- 
guage L(Q) we can give a very e!ementary "syntactical" version of 
Gaifman's proof. Let (Ult) be the following set of axiom schemes 
of L(Q), the ones which correspond in Theorem 3.1 5.4 to a non- 
principal ultrafilter: 
Axiom schemes 1, 2, 3 of L(Q); 
(Ult) = (Qx)@^ 4) +-* (Qx)~o ^ (Qx)~; 
(Qx) 7~0 ++ 7(Qx)~o. 
Lemma 3.15.5. Suppose 2; is a set o f  sentences o f  L such that 
tA {TCm-  Cv: m < p < co} 
is consistent. Then ~, is consistent relative to the axiom schemes 
(Ult). 
Proof: By the G~Sdel completeness theorem, 2; has an infinite mod- 
el 9.[. Let q be a non-principal ultrafilter over A. Then (9~, q) is a 
weak model of 2; in the language L(Q), and (Ult) holds in (~[, q). 
Hence 22 is consistent relative to (Ult). --t 
Note that only the easy direction of 3.15.4 was used in the 
above simple proof. Now using the above lemma we shall prove 
the Ehrenfeucht-Mostowski theorem, with a purely syntactical 
argument in the language L(Q) with the axiom schemes (Ult). 
Proof of the Ehrenfeucht-Mostowski theorem: By the lemma, ~ is 
consistent relative to (Ult). Let ~' be a maximal consistent exten- 
sion of I~. Define P to be the set of all sentences ~0(c 0...c n) of L 
plus the constants Co, c l ,  ... such that 
(Qv o) ... (Qv n) sO(Vo ... v n) ~ ~'  . 
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By induction on m and n, all sentences of  the form 
Am0(Qu0) ... (Qvn)so i ~ (Qv 0) ... (QVn) Aim o ~oi, 
are provable from (Ult). It fol lows that the set P is closed under 
finite conjunction. Moreover, the scheme 
(Qo 0) ... (QVn)~O -. (BOo) . . .  (3 Vn)~O 
is provable from (Ult), by  the proof  of Lemma 1.90). Therefore 
each sentence ~(c o... c n) ~ P is consistent with 2;' relative to (Ult), 
hence is consistent with 2;. It  follows that I" is consistent with 2;. 
Again by induction, the scheme 
(Qu0)... (QVn ) -1 ~o ~ -q (Qv 0 )... (Qv n ) ~o 
is provable from (Ult). Thus for each sentence ~o(c 0... cn) , exactly 
one of  the sentences 
~o(c o... c~),  q~o(c0 ... c,)  
belongs to P. Whence lP is maximal consistent. 
To complete the proof  it suffices to show that if ~O(Co... Cn)E P 
and m 0 < ... < rn n , then ~O(Crn ~... Cmn) E P. By changing bound 
variables we may assume none of Vo, ..., Umn occur in ~o(c0... cn). 
The fol lowing are provable using Axiom 3: 
(Qv0) ... (Qvn)~O(Vo ... Vn)*-~ (OY0)... (QYn)~O(Yo ... yn) ,  
(QVmo) -.. (Qum n) ~0(Vm o ... Vm n) ~ (QYo)... (QYn }~~ yn), 
where the y 's  are new variables. Furthermore, if x does not occur 
in ~J then (Qx)qJ ~-~ ~ is provable from (Ult), whence 
(Qvmo) ... ( QVmn) ~O(Vm o ... Vmn) 
(Qv O) ... ( QOmn) tP(Vmo ... Vm n) 
is provable. Thus if ~O(Co... Cn)~ V, then 
(Qvo) ... (Qun)~O(V 0 ... On) E ~' , 
(Qvo) ... (QVmn) ~Vrn o ... Vmn ) e 2'  , 
and hence ~O(Cm o ... Cm n) ~ r'. --t 
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w Omitting Wpes in L(Q) 
In 3.5 we gave a sufficient condition for a set of sentences of 
L(Q) to have a standard model which omits a set of formulas )2(x), 
provided that P t---l(Qx)o for some oE Z. In this section we shall 
prove a similar result for the general case where there is not neces- 
sarily a o~ Z such that P ~- --l(Qx)o. Intuitively, the result 3.5.1 
gave a condition for having a model in which the intersection of a 
given sequence of countable classes is empty, while our present 
problem is to find a model in which an arbitrary given sequence of 
classes is empty. The proof of the theorem will be a refinement of 
the methods already used in Section 2. We shall see later in w 5 that 
the theorem has applications to the following question of classical 
first order model theory: 
How maay non-isomorphic models of power co 1 does a theory 
have? 
Definition 4.1. Let )2(x) be a set o f  formulas of  L(Q) and let I' be 
a set o f  sentences of  L(Q). We shall say that P strongly omits Y, iff 
for every formula ~o(x l... x n) of  L(Q) and evely string (S) of  ] 
and Q quantifiers over the variables x l, ..., x n, if  (S)(3x)~o is con- 
sistent with F then there exists a ~ )2 such that (S)(3x)(~o ^-1 a) is 
consistent with F. 
Lemma 4.2. Let L' be a (possibly uncountable)first-order logic, 
let g~ be a model for L', let r be the set o f  olI sentenees of  L'(Q) 
which hold in 91, and let 2(x) be a countable set of  formulas o f  
L'(Q). l f  2~ omits ~(x) then P strongly omits l~(x). If" 91= 91" and 
P strongly omits N(x), then 9.i omits )2(x). 
Proof: Assume that 91 omits Z(x). Suppose (S)(3x)~o is consistent 
with P. Then 9i ~ (S)(3x)~o. Since 91 omits $(x), we have using an 
infinite disjunction, 
91 ~ (S)(~x) Voez (~0 ^ -]a). 
Since countable unions of countable, or empty, sets are countable, 
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or empty respectively, both (Qxm) and (3x m) commute with count- 
able disjunctions in 9~. Therefore 
~I p Vo~ (S)(3x)(~o^7o),  
so there is a ~ ~ 2; such that 
92 P (S)(3x)(~0^7o).  
Hence the above sentence is consistent with P, and we have shown 
that P strongly omits ~. 
Now assume ~= 92* does not omit ~. Then some a~A satisfies 
2; in 92. Hence the sentence (3x)(x = c a) is consistent with I', but 
for all a a E, the formula (3 x) (x =-- c a A 7 a(x)) is not consistent 
with P. So P does not strongly omit ~. -I 
Our main result is 
Theorem 4.3. Let P be a set o f  sentences and ~.~(xn), n< co, sets 
o f  formulas o f  L(Q). I f  I" is consistent and strongly omits each En, 
then P has a standard model which omits each 2 n. 
To prove Theorem 4.3 we shall state a series of lemmas corre- 
sponding to the lemmas used in the proof of the Completeness 
Theorem for L(Q), and we shall point out where additional steps 
in the proof are needed. We first need an analogue of Lemma 2.4 
on weak models which omit types. 
Definition. Let (92i, q) be a weak model which satisfies all the 
axioms of L(Q). We say that (~(,q) strongly omits l~(x) i f f  the set 
o f  all sentences true in (g[ *, q) strongly omits Z(x). Equivalently, 
for every sentence (S)(3x)~ which holds in (92", q), there exists 
a~ 2; such that (S)(3x)(~o ^7o)ho lds  in (~*, q). 
Lemma 2.4*. Let I" be a consistent set of  sentences of L(Q)and 
for each n < r let ~n(Xn) be a set o f  formulas of  L(Q). Assume 
that I" strongly omits each set ~n. Then I" has a countable weak 
model (9~, q) which strongly omits each set 2;n. 
60 H.J.Keisler, Logic with the quantifier "there exist uncountably many" 
Proof: The proof of this lemma requires omewhat more care than 
the proof of Lemma 2.4. We must use the scheme of valid formulas 
in 3.1 (i) involving strings of quantifiers (S). First extend the lan- 
guage L to L* by adding a countable set C of new individual con- 
stants. It suffices, by Lemma 2.2, to extend P to a maximal con- 
sistent set P* of sentences of L* such that 
(1) 
and 
(2) 
C is a set of witnesses for F*, 
F* strongly omits each set E n. 
In order to do this we need the following: 
(3) Suppose the sentence 
^ (S)(3Xn)~O 
of L*(Q) is consistent with P. Then there exists a~ 2; n 
such that 
qJ ^  (S)(3xn)(~o ^7o)  
is consistent with F. 
We prove (3). Note that, by 3.1 (i), 
(4) [- ~ A (S)(3Xn)hO-+ (S ) (3Xn) (~ A~0 ) . 
Let c 1, . . . ,  c v be all the constants of L* which occur in qJ and ~o, 
and form r and ~o' by replacing each c i by a new variable u i. Then 
by (3) and the consistency of ~ A (S)(3Xn)~O with P, we see that 
the sentence 
(3U 1 ... Up)(S)(: : lXn)(@'A r 
of L(Q) is consistent with F. Then since F strongly omits ~n and 
since the string 
(3ul  ... up)(S) 
w Omitting types in L(Q) 61 
is made up of  3's and Q's, there is a a~ I] n such that 
(3 Ul... un)(S)(3Xn)(r 
is consistent with P. It follows that 
(S)(~xn)(~ ^4o ^ To) 
is consistent with F in L*(Q), whence by 3.1(i) again, 
r ^ (S)(3xn)(~ ^7o) 
is consistent with P. This proves (3). 
Now by the familiar construction using an appropriate listing of 
the sentences of L*(Q), a set F* D P with the desired properties 
may be found. -I 
Lemma 2.5*. Let (gd~, q~x), ~ < % be an elementaty chain with 
union (9(, q). I f  ~(x) is a set of  ]brmulas, f3< 7, and (~,  q~) strong- 
ly omits 2 for 13 ~ ~ < % then (~, q) strongly omits Z,. 
This follows at once from Lemma 2.5. 
The next lemma shows that Theorem 3.5.1 is a consequence of
Theorem 4.3. 
Lemma 4.4. Let P be a set o f  formulas and Z,(x) a set of  sentences 
o f  L(Q). Assume that: 
(i) There is a ao~ s such that P b- -l(Qx)%. 
(ii) For all formulas ~o(x) such that (3x)~o(x) is consistent with F, 
there exists oE ~, such that (qx)(~o A-]O) is consistent with f'. 
Then P strongly omits "2,. 
Proof: Suppose (S)(3x)~0 is consistent with P. We want to find a 
o E l~ such that 
(1) (S)(3x)(r  i--10) is consistent with P. 
If (1) holds for cr = or0, we are finished. Suppose (I) fails for ~r = a0. 
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Then 
(2) 
Since 
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P t- 7 (S) (3x) (~o^TOo)  9 
~- ~p~-+ (~p Aa0) V (~p ATO0) , 
it follows from 3.1 (ii) that 
p (S)(~x)~o ~ (S ) (3x)@^ %)  v (S) (3X)@A 70  o) . 
Thus by (2), the sentence (S)(3x)(~o a %) is consistent with F. 
Now by 3. l(iii), with u l ,  ..., u n being the variables occurring in (S), 
we have 
[-- (S) (3 x) (~o ^  ao) -+ (3x) (S) (~o A a 0) v (Qx) (3 u l...  u n) (~o A ao) .  
But P t- 7 (Qx)a o, and by Axiom 2, 
~- (Qx)(3ul. . .  ttn)(~o ^ a O) .-+ (Ox)o 0 , 
whence 
P ~- 7(Qx)(3Ul. . .  Un)(~O ^ ao) .  
It follows that (3x)(S) (~o A%) is consistent with P. None of the 
variables Ul, . . . ,u n are flee in %, so by 3.10), 
~- (S)(~OA %)  + o 0 A (S)~o, 
and it follows that 
p (3x) (S ) (?A  a0) -~ (3x)(S)~o, 
whence (3x)(S)~o is consistent with P. 
By hypothesis (ii), there is a aE ~ such that (3x) (Ta  A (S)~o) is 
consistent with P. Again by 3.1 (i), 
I-- no  A (S)~o -+ (S)(na A ~p), 
so 
I-- (~x) (7o  A (S)~o) -+ (3x) (S ) (qa  ^  so). 
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By 3.1 (iii) 
~- (3x)(S)(-7a^~o) -, (S)(3x)(-1 a^~) .  
It follows from the two above formulas that (S)(-~x)(-7 a A ~) is 
consistent with P. Thus P strongly omits I~. -I 
Lemma 2.7*. Let (9i, q) be a countable weak model in which all 
the axioms o f  L(Q) hold and let ~o(x) be a formula o f  L*(Q) such 
that ( 9~*, q ) ~ (Qx)~o. Let 20(x0), 21(x 1) .... be a countable collec- 
tion o f  sets or formulas of  L* (Q) such that (9i, q) strongly omits 
each 2 n. Then (9C, q) has a countable lementary extension (93,r) 
such that 
(i) There isa b~B-A  with (2~*,r) ~ ~o[b]. 
(ii) frO, r) strongly omits each set 2,,. 
Note that Lemmas 2.7 and 2.7* are exactly the same except 
that conclusion (ii) of 2.7 is replaced by (ii) of 2.7*. By Lemma 
4.4, (9.I, q) strongly omits every set of formulas 
{~(y)}U( - ly~ca:aEA and (9[*,q)~ q)(ca)} 
such that (~[*, q) N 7(Q,v)qJ. There are only countably many such 
sets, and if they are all in the list l~ n then conclusion (ii) of 2.7* 
implies (ii) of 2.7. Thus 2.7* is an improvement of 2.7. 
Proof of Lemma 2.7*. As in the proof of 2.7, extend L* to L' by 
adding a new constant c, and let P be the set of all sentences of L' 
of the forms 
(a) All sentences of L*(Q) true in (9~[*, q); 
(b) ~0(c); 
(c) -]r for every ~(y) in L*(Q) such that (~*,q) ~ 7 (Qy) ~(y). 
In the proof of Lemma 2.7 we have already established that: 
(1) A sentence O(c) is consistent with r if and only if 
(9~[*,q) N (Qu)(0(u) A ~O(U)) ;
(2) F is consistent. 
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In view of Lemma 2.4", it suffices to show that 
(3) F strongly omits each of the sets 1~ n, 
In fact, since the sets 2; n were not involved in the definition of  P, 
we shall actually show 
(4) P strongly omits every set ~(~) of formulas of L*(Q) which 
(9I, q) strongly omits. 
To prove (4), assume that (91,q) strongly omits Z(y). Let (S)(3y)0 
be consistent with P, where as usual (S) is a string of  3 and Q quan- 
tillers, and 0 is a formula of L'(Q). Let u be a new variable and 
form 0' by replacing c by u. Then 
(91",q) N (Qu)(~o(u) A(S)(3y)0') .  
By 3.1 (i), 
t- ~o(u) A (S)(3y)0'  -' (S)(?y)(~o(u) A 0 ' ) ,  
whence by Axiom 2, 
(Qu)(~(u) ^ (S)(3y)O') ~ (Qu)(S)(3y)(~o(u) A 0') .  
Therefore 
(92*, q) N (Qu)(S)(3y)(~p(u) A 0') .  
The string (Qu)(S) is still made up of Q's and 3's. Thus since (92, q) 
strongly omits l~(y), there is a a~ ~ such that 
(92*, q) N (Qu) (S) (3y) (~p(u) A 0' A 7 O). 
By 3.1 (i) and Axiom 2, 
k-- (Qu)(S)(3y)(~o(u)A O'ATa) 
+-~ (Qu)[~o(t~) A (S) (3y)(0' ATo)] ,  
whence 
(92", q) N (Qu)[~o(u) A (S) (3y) (0' A 7 a)l 9 
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Thus by (1), the sentence (S)(3y)(0/~-le) is consistent with P. 
This shows that P strongly omits $(y) and verifies (4). -I 
Lemma 2.8*. Let (9~, q) and 20(x0), ~1(xl), ... satisfy the hypo- 
theses of Lemma 2.7*. Then there is a countable lementary ex- 
tension (~, r) of  (9~, q) such that: 
(i) For all formulas ~o(x) of  L*(Q), (~, q) N (Qx)~(x) if and only if 
there exists b e B -A  such that (N*,r) ~ ~o[b]; 
(ii) (2(, r) strongly omits each set F, n. 
Proof: Let ~0(Yo), r be a list of all the formulas ~(y) of 
L*(Q) such that (9~*,q) ~ "q (Qx) ~0(y). Since (~[,q) and L are count- 
able, there are countably many such formulas. For each n let An(yn) 
be the following set of formulas of L*(Q); 
An = {~n(Yn)} tO {TYn--Ca : a~A}.  
By Lemma 4.4, (9I, q) strongly omits each set A n. Now we apply 
Lemma 2.7* countably many times to obtain an elementary chain 
(9~m, qm) of countable weak models, such that (2[ 0, q0) = (9~, q), 
each (9~ m, qm) strongly omits all of the sets Zn, An, and whenever 
(9~, q) ~ (Qx)~0(x) there is an m< w and bEAm+I-A m such that 
(9~m+ 1,qm+l) ~ ~p[b]. 
By Lemma 2.5", the union (~, r) of the chain also strongly 
omits each Zn and A n. By 2.5, (~,r)~-(~,q), and (2~,r) satisfies 
the "only if" part of (i). Finally, since (~8, r) strongly omits each 
An, if b ~B then either (~*, r) ~ "q ~n(Cb) or there exists aEA such 
that (23", r) ~ c b =- Ca, whence b ~ A. Thus (i) holds. -t 
Proof of Theorem 4.3. By Lemma 2.4*, P has a countable weak 
model (gJ, q) which strongly omits each Zn. Then using Lemma 2.5* 
and 2.8* w 1 times we obtain an elementary extension (~,r) of 
(~,q) such that: 
(1) (~,r) strongly omits each set Zn, 
(2) For all sentences ~ of the language of (~*, r), we have 
(~*, r) ~ ~o if and only if ~* ~ ~. 
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(The proof of (2) was given in Section 2.) 
It follows that ~ is a standard model of I', and the set of all 
sentences true in ~3' strongly omits each 12 n. Then by Lemma 4.2, 
~3", and thus also N, omits each set l~ n. -I 
Corollary 4.5. Let P be a complete theory in L(Q) and let Eo(Xo), 
s l) .... be countably many sets o f formulas of  L(Q). I f  for each 
n< w P has a standard model which omits ~'n, then r' has a stan- 
dard model which simultaneously omits each set F,n, n < w. 
Proof: Let 91n be a standard model of P which omits 2; n. Since F is 
complete, we see from Lemma 4.2 that P strongly omits each ]~n. 
The result follows by Theorem 4.3. -I 
The following lemma gives a necessary and sufficient condition 
for a set of sentences to strongly omit a set of formulas. It can be 
used for applications of Theorem 4.3. We shall say that an elemen- 
tary chain (91n, qn), n < w, of weak models is precise iff for each 
n< t~ and each formula ~(v) of the language of (~:*,qn), we have 
(9i*, qn) ~ (QY)qJ if and only if there exists b ~A,~ 1 -A  n such that 
(9/n+l, qn+l) ~ ~ [b]. (Thus a precise chain of length co 1 was used 
in the proof of w 2.) 
Lemma 4.6. Let P be a consistent set o f  sentencee and F,(x) a set 
of  formulas o f  L(Q). Then the following condition is necessary and 
sufficient for P to strongly omit )2: For crept sentence 0 of  L(Q) 
which is consistent with F, there exists a precise elementaIy chain 
(gJ, n, qn), n < co, o f  countable weak models o f  P u {0 } such that 
each (91n, qn) omits F,. 
Proof: The necessity follows from the proof of Theorem 4.3. We 
prove the sufficiency. Suppose (S)(3x)~ is consistent with F. Then 
there is a precise elementary chain (~[n, qn), n < co, as above with 
0 = (S)(3x)r We may assume 
(S) = (Qyl)(-~zl)... (Qym)(3zm). 
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Then there exist elements bp E Ap-Ap-1,  ep ~Ap, for p = 1, ..., m, 
such that 
(~[m, qm) ~ (qx)tP[blCl "" bmCm] " 
Since (9i m, qm) omits I;(x) there exists a~ I~ such that 
(~[m, qm) ~ (3x)(~~ A--l~ bl Cl "" bmcm] '
Reversing the process, we have 
(9Io, qo ) ~ (S)(3x)(~OAgO). 
Since (9/0, qo)is a model of I' and, by 3.5.3, also a model of all the 
axioms of L(Q), we conclude that (S) ( 3 x) (~o ^  -1 a) is consistent 
with P, whence P strongly omits ~. -9 
The next corollary is similar to Corollary 3.5.2. 
Corollary 4.7. Let (9/m, qm), m < w, be a precise elementary 
chain of  countable weak models for L(Q), and )2n(Yn), n < co, be 
sets o f formulas o f  L(Q). Suppose that fop" each m, n < 6o, (9~m, qm) 
omits ~n(.Yn). Then (9~ o, qo) has a standard elementary extension 
of  power 6o 1 which omits each ~n' 
Proof: By Theorem 4.3 and Lemma 4.6. -I 
As an illustration we give an application to archimedean ordered 
fields. 
Corollary 4.8. Let ~(:m, m < w, be an elementary chain of  archime- 
dean ordered fieMs such that for each m < w and each formula 
~b(x) in the language of  ~*, the following are equivalent: 
(i) (aEAm: 9Y* ~ ~[a]} contains an interval; 
(ii) For some b EAm+ 1-Am, * ~m+l ~ ~[b]. 
Then ~o has an uncountable archimedean elementary extension. 
Proof: Let qm be the set of all Xc  A m which contain an interval. 
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Then in each 9~:m, each formula (Qx)r is equivalent to (3y, z)[y < z ^  
^(Vx)(y < x < z -+ qJ)], where y and z do not occur in ~O. Then 
(9~m, qrn) is a precise elementary chain. Let l~(y) be the set of for- 
mulas 
l~(y) = {n<y:  n=0,  1,2,...}. 
Thus an ordered field is archimedean if and only if it omits Z(y), 
whence each ~m omits N(y). The conclusion follows by 4.7. -I 
Our entire discussion in this section can be readily generalized 
to sets of formulas in finitely many variables. We say that F strong- 
ly omits a set ~(.Vl... y~) of formulas iff for every formula 
~o(y 1... yp x 1... Xn) and every string (S) of 3- and Q-quantifiers on 
x 1 ..... x n, if (S)(3y 1 ... yp)~0 is consistent with P then there exists 
a(y 1... Yp ) E ~ such that (S) (3 y 1... Yp) (~o A 7 ~) is consistent with I'. 
Then using the same proofs as before, we have 
Theorem 4.9. Let F be a set of  sentences and •n(Ynl...Ynpn) , n< w, 
be sets o f  formulas ofL(Q),  l f  P is consistent and P strongly omits 
each Y'n, then P has a standard model which omits each ~n' 
The analogues of 4 .5-4.7 also hold. Using Theorem 4.9 we can 
give a completeness theorem for the infintary logic formed by com- 
bining L~ol~ with L(Q). The language Lwl w (see [1 ], [ 13]) is 
formed from L by allowing countable infinite conjunctions, but 
only finite quantifiers. We shall denote by L~o~o(Q) the language 
formed by adding to L,o~o the additional quantifier (Qx). Then the 
notion 
9~ ~ ~o[a 1... an] , 
where ~p(xl... Xn) is a formula of Lw~o(Q), may be defilaed in the 
obvious way. 
The completeness theorem for Lw lw is proved in [ 1 ], [ 13 ]. We 
shall now give a list of axioms and inference rules for L~o~(Q): 
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I. Ax iom schemes 0-4  of L(Q); 
II. An<,o(~o~ O n) -+ (~o~ An<,~On), 
III. An<~r n ~ era, (m< co) ; 
IV. (Qx)Vn<~o~O n "+ Vn<o~(Qx)r n 
(where Vn<wO n means 7 An<~o~ O n) . 
The rules of inference are modus ponens, generalization, and the 
rule of conjunction: 
V.  From t~o , r r ... infer An<we n . 
Thus L~o~,~(Q) has the axiom schemes of L(Q) and those of 
L~ol~o, plus the additional scheme Axiom co. Its rules of inference 
are the same as for Lw~o. 
Infinitary propo- 
sitional axioms 
Axiom co 
Theorem 4.10 (Completeness theorem for L~olo,(Q)). A sentence ~o 
oa" Lcolw(Q) is consistent i f  and only if ~o has a standard model. 
Sketch of proof. It is obvious that if ~0 has a standard model then ~o 
is consistent. Assume that ~o is consistent. Since ~0 is a sentence, each 
subformula of ~o has only finitely many free variables. Moreover, ~o 
has only countably many subformulas. For each subformula 
r  z... x n) of ~o, introduce a new predicate symbol Re with n places 
forming an expanded language L'. Let P be the set of sentences of 
L,',lw(Q) consisting of ~0 plus the sentences 
(VX1... Xn)(r Xn) ++ R~p(Xl...Xn) ) 
for each subfonnula r of ~o. It is not hard to show that P is con- 
sistent in L~o I~(Q), for any deduction of a contradiction from P 
can be made into a deduction of a contradiction from ~o in L,o~o(Q) 
by eliminating the symbols Re in favor of r Thus the set P0 of all 
sentences of L'(Q) deducible from F is consistent in L'(Q). 
We claim that whenever 
r Yp) = An<u~r Yp) 
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is a subformula of ~o, then the set 
(1) {-qRr 
is strongly omitted by ['0 in the sense of L'(Q). This is where 
Axiom co is used. For suppose a sentence (S)(3y 1 ... yp)O of L'(Q) 
is consistent with P0. Assume that for each n < co 
(S) (3Yl-.. Yn) (0 • -1RqJn(Yl... Yn)) 
is inconsistent with Po, whence 
Po ~ q(S)(~Yl.. .  Yn)(O A7R% (yl... yn)) " 
Then for each n, 
I~ }- -7 (S)(:IYl... Yn) (0 A-7 d/n), 
so by the rule of conjunction and the infinite propositional axioms, 
1" p -1Vn<~o(S)(3yl... yn)(O A-ld/n). 
Using Axiom co finitely many times, we get 
I- 7Vn<~(S) (3y~... Yn) (0 A 7 d/,,) 
-~ 7 (S)(: iyt.. .  Yn)Vn<w(O ~7 d/n). 
Therefore 
P I-- q(S)(3ya... Yn) V~<~o( 0 A-7 ~n), 
whence 
(2) P I- 7(s)(3y~... y~)(o A-7~). 
Since (S)(qyl.. .  Yn)O is assumed to be consistent with 1-" 0 in L'(Q), 
it must also be consistent with I ~ in L~ol~o(Q), and hence by (2) and 
3.1 (ii), the sentence 
(s)(~yl... yn)(O ^  d/) 
is consistent with P. It follows that 
(S) (3Yl ... Yn) (0 A Rr 1"" Yn)) 
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is consistent with F0, so P 0 strongly omits the set (1). 
We may now apply Theorem 4.9 to obtain a standard model 9I' 
of P0 which omits each set of the form (1). It is then easy to check 
that the reduct 9,[ of 9I' to L is a standard model of ~o. 
Corollary 4.1 1. Let rb be a countable set of formulas of  L,o~w(Q) 
which is closed under sub formulas, finite connectives, and the 
quantifiers V, 3, Q, and where each ~ ~ c~ has only finitely many 
free variables. Let ~oE eo be a sentence. Suppose there exists a chain 
(~m, qm), m < 60, of  weak models of  ~o which is a precise elementary 
chain with respect o cb (in the obvious ense). Then ~o has a stan- 
dard model. 
Proof: As in the proof of 4.1 0, introduce anew predicate symbol 
R~ for each ~ E q~. Interpret R~ in (gl:m, qm) by the relation R%~ 
such that Rr m ,~, ~ holds, and denote the expanded models by ~m. 
t 
Then (~m, qm), m < co, is a precise lementary chain in the sense of 
the finitary language L'(Q). Moreover, whenever @ = A n ~o~n E ~,  
the set 
(1) {-]Rq~(yl...yp)}u {Rq~n(yl...yp): n<co} 
! I is omitted by each (92 m, qm). Hence by 4.7, (92[o, q0) has a standard 
elementary extension N' which omits each set of formulas (1). It 
follows that the reduct N of ~' is a standard model of ~o. --t 
This gives a verion of Coollary 3.5.3 for L~lto: 
Corollary 4.12. Let cp be a countable set of  formulas of  L~ol~ which 
is closed under finite connectives and quantifiers, and where each 
qj ~ cb has only finitely many free variables. Let ~n "(An,Rn, "''~ be 
countable models for L, where R n is binary, such that for each n, 
9~n+ 1 is an elementary end extension o f  ~n with respect o cb. Then 
~[o has an uncountable lementary end extension with respect o e#. 
The completeness theorem for L,ol~ can be improved by restrict- 
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ing our attention to a well-behaved set ,b of formulas of Lto1~o(Q). 
For such sets of formulas ~, we can obtain sharper forms of the two 
preceding corollaries. 
Let us call a set 9 of formulas of L~o~o(Q) afragment iff all for- 
mulas of L(Q) belong to 9 and 9 is closed under the following: 
subformulas; 
ffiaite connectives and quantifiers; 
substitution of a free variable by a term; 
if (An<~o~On)~ ~ and 0 E ~, then An<~o(0 v ~n), An<~o-q ~n, 
An<w(Vx)~n, An<~(-qx)qJn, and An<~o(Qx)qJ n all belong 
to q~. 
A sentence ~ r is said to be Oh-consistent iff there is no proof of 
the sentence -q~o in Lw~o(Q) consisting of a sequence of formulas 
in ~. Using the proof of 4.10 we can obtain the following stronger 
results. 
Theorem 4.10". Let cb be a fragment ofL~ol~o(Q). A sentence ~o~ q~ 
is oh-consistent if  and only if ~o has a standard model. 
Corollary 4.11". Let rb be a countable fragment o f  L~o~o(Q) each 
of whose elements has at most finitely many free variables. Let 
(91, q) be a countable weak model. Then the following are equiva- 
lent: 
(i) All the axioms of  L~o:o(Q) which belong to 9 hold in (9I, q). 
(ii) (9s has an elementary extension (~,r) with respect o r such 
that for all r xnY)a  ~ and al, ..., a n CA, 
(91,q) ~ (Qy)~ [al...an] 
i f  and only if  
for some b ~ B-A ,  (~3,r) ~ $ [ al... a n b ] . 
(iii) (9d, q)has an elementary extension (~,r) with respect o e~ 
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such that (ii) above holds and r is the set o f  all uncountable 
subsets o f  B. 
lh'oof: The proof that (i) implies (iii) is like the proof of 4.10, and 
uses Lemma 2.8*. It is obvious that (iii) implies (ii). Assume (ii). 
By Corollary 3.5.2, all the axioms of L(Q) which belong to ~b hold 
in (9~, q). Suppose 
(Vn<w~.ln(Xl...Xn)) @ c~ 
and 
(gY,q) N (QY) Vn<~n[al . . .  an]. 
Then for some c ~ B-A ,  
(~,r) ~ Vn~,oqJn[al... anC]. 
Thus for some n < w, 
(23,r) ~ qJn[al.., a n c]. 
Thence 
(9.I,q) D (Qy) ~n[al... an] , 
(92, q) ~ v.,,o(Qy) r an]. 
Therefore all instances of Axiom 6o which belong to ~ hold in 
(gJ,q), and (i) holds. -t 
Corollary 4.12*. Let qJ be a countable fragment of  L~ lo~ (Q) each 
o f  whose elements contains at most finitely many free variables. 
Let 9~ = (A,R .... ) be a countable model where R is binary, and let q 
be the set o f  all subsets of  A cofinal in <A,R). 
Suppose (~, q) has an end extension (2~, r) which is an elemen- 
tary extension with respect o ~. Then 9~ has an uncountable and 
extension ~' which is a standard elementary extension of  (9~, q) 
with respect o ~. 
The language L(q) with (qx) interpreted as "there exist infinite- 
ly many x" is well known to be closely related to the languages 
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L~olw and L ~~ (see [23], [7]). At first glance it seems more natural 
to combine L(Q) with L(q) than with Lw~,o or with L ~~ Let L(q,Q) 
be the language formed by adding to L the two quantifiers (qx), 
(Qx). If 9.i is a model for L and ~o is a sentence of L(q, Q), then 
9I N tO will mean that ~o holds in 9i when (qx), (Qx) are interpreted 
by 
"there exist infinitely many x", 
"there exist uncountably many x", 
respectively. Using Theorem 4.9 above, we can also obtain a com- 
pleteness theorem for the language L(q, Q). 
The axioms for L(q, Q) are: 
I. Axiom schemes 0-4  o f  L(Q): 
II. (qx)~o(x) -~ (3~nx)% (n < co) 
where (3~nx)~o means (Vyl... yn_l)(3x)(tO^ qx-Y l  A ... A 
A"]X= Yn_ l  ). 
The rules of inference are modus ponens, generalization, and the 
following version of the co-rule." 
III. Let ~o be a formula of  L(q, Q) and let (S) be a string of  3 and Q 
quantifiers. From -1(S)7(3-'1y)% 7(S)7(3->2y)~o ...., infer 
-1 (S)7 (qy)~. 
The co-rule is the only one which differentiates q and Q. It pre- 
serves validity in standard models because the union of countably 
many countable sets is countable. In the case that (S) is the empty 
string, the co-rule above reduces to the more familiar co-rule for 
L(q): 
From (3~1y)% (_~a2y)~ o .... , infer (qy)to. 
It turns out that the following formulas a/:e already provable from 
the axioms and rules of inference of L(q, Q): 
Axioms I -4  with q in place of Q; 
(Qx)~o -+ (qx)~o; 
Lemma 1.9(i)-(v) with q in place of Q. 
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Using an argument similar to the completeness proof for L~o~(Q) , 
one can prove the following theorem. It again depends on Theorem 
4.9. 
Theorem 4.13 (Completeness Theorem for L(q, Q). A set of  sen- 
tences Y, of L(q, Q) is consistent if and only if Y, has a standard 
model. 
The weak second order logic of Tarski [29], which is also known 
to be closely related to L ~, can be treated in a similar manner, and 
an analogous completeness theorem can readily be given for weak 
second order logic with Q. 
The following is an application of Corollary 4.7 to the language 
L(q). 
Corollary 4.14. Let ~m, m < 03, be countable infinite models for L 
which form an elementary chain in the sense of  L(q), and such that 
for each m < co and each formula t~(x) o f  L(q), i f  gYtn ~ (qx)~(x) 
then there exists bEAm+t-A  m such that ~rm+l ~ r Then ~o 
has an uncountable lementary extension ~ in the sense of L(q). 
Proof: For each n, let qn be the set of all infinite subsets ofA n. 
Then (9I. m, qm) forms a precise lementary chain in the sense of 
L(Q). Moreover, each (9I m, qm) omits each set of formulas 
(1) {-l(Qx)ff } u {(3anx)qs: n< co) . 
Therefore (9~ o, q0) has a standard elementary extension 2~ which 
omits each set of the form (1), by Corollary 4.7. ~ is uncountable 
because (9.[ o, q o ) ~ ( Qx ) (x - x ). Since ~ omits (1), for each formula 
~(x) we have ~* ~ (Qx) f (x)  if and only if 2~* ~ (qx)qJ(x). Thus 
is an elementary extension of 9~ 0 in the sense of L(q~). -I 
Needless to say, the above corollary can also be stated more gen- 
erally for the language L(q, Q), with ~tm, m < 03, replaced by a pre- 
cise elementary chain of weak models for L(q, Q), and ~ by a stan- 
dard model for L(q, Q). 
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w Models of power w 1 
In this section we shall apply the theorems in w 4 to study models 
of power w 1. We shall prove some general lemmas about the lan- 
guage L(Q) and apply them to first order logic. We show in Corol- 
lary 5.6 that every theory of L which has uncountably many types 
has exactly 2 ~~ non-isomorphic models of power w 1. This result is 
apparently new for first order logic, and is also generalized in Co- 
rollaries 5.9 and 5.10 to w-logic and L~ol~ o.We also generalize to 
w-logic and Lwl~o the result of Ehrenfeucht and Mostowski [ 5 ] that 
for any theory of L which has an infinite model, only countably 
many types are satisfied in every uncountable model of the theory 
(see Corollaries 5.7, 5.9, 5.1 1). Finally, we obtain a series of sharp- 
er results along these lines for the special cases of second order 
number theory and set theory (Theorems 5.13 and 5.14), where 
we can be very specific about which types can be omitted in un- 
countable models. 
I.emma 5.1 (Downward L6wenheim-Skolem Theorem). Let  (.23, r) be 
a weak model for L(Q), let X c B, and let ~ be an infinite cardinal 
such that IXI ~ ~ ~< IB I. Then there is an elementary submodel 
(~r, q) ~ (23, r) such that X c A and [A I = ~. 
This lemma is the generalization of a theorem of Tarski-Vaught 
[30] to L(Q), and the proof is essentially the same. 
Proof of Lemma 5.1 : As in [30], we find a set A c B of power 
such that Xc  A and for all al, . . . ,a n E A and all formulas r 1... xny)  
of L(Q), if 
(~,r)  ~ (3y)~o[a 1 ... an] 
then there exists b ~ A such that 
9 (23, r) ~ ~0[a 1... % b] . 
Now we define q to be the set of all Yc  A such that for some for- 
mula ~o(xt... XnY) and a 1 ..... a n E A, 
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(~,r)  ~ (Qy)tp[al... a n] , 
and 
Y={bEA:  (23, r) ~ ~o[al... a,~b]}. 
We claim that (9~, q) -< (23, r). Tile only step of the proof which dif- 
fers from [30] is to show that if a formula ~(x 1... xny)  of L(Q) has 
the property 
(1) For all al. . .anb ~ A, 
(~,q)  ~ ~o[al... a,,b] iff (23, r) ~ ~o[al... anb] , 
then so does the formula (Qy~.  
If 
(23, r) ~ (Qy)  ~o[a 1... a,, ] , 
then the set 
{b6A:  (23,1") ~ ~[al... anb]) ~ q, 
whence using ( l)  for ~p, 
(9~, q) ~ (Qy)~o[a 1 ... a , ] .  
Assume 
(2I, q) ~ (Qy)~o[a 1 ... a,,]. 
Then there is a formula $(u 1 ... u m u) and b I ..... b m ~ A such that 
~, ~o have no common variables and 
(2},r) ~ (Qu) ~[b I... b m] 
and 
{a~A: (?3, r) ~ ~o[at,.. a~za]} 
={b~A:  (2},r) ~ $[b 1... bmb]}.  
Therefore, 
(23',r) ~ so(a I ... a,~a) +-+ qJ(b 1 ... bma) 
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holds for all a 6 A. By the choice of  A, 
(2~*,r) ~ (Vy)(~o(al... anY)++ ff(b 1 ... bray)). 
Hence 
whence 
{a~B: (~,r)  ~ ~o[a 1... ana]} 
= (bEB: (2~,r) M ~[b 1... bnb])~ r ,  
(~,r) ~ (Qy)~o[al... anl 9 
Thus (Qy)~o satisfies (1).-I 
Lemma 5.2. I f  (~, q)-< (~, r), then every set of  formulas of L(Q) 
which is strongly omitted by (~, r) is also strongly omitted by 
(~,q). 
Proof: This follows at once from the fact that a formula of the 
language of (21', q) holds in (9~*, q) iff it holds in (~*, r). --4 
I_emma 5.3. Let • be a consistent set of  sentences of  L(Q) and let 
T be a family of sets ~,(x) of formulas of  L(Q). Suppose that Jbr 
any two distinct members ~l(x), ~2(x) of T, F strongly omits the 
union Zl(x) u Z2(x). Then F strongly omits all but eountably many 
members of T. 
Proof: For each ~ ~ T which is not strongly omitted by F, there is 
a formula ~z of L(Q) and a string (Sz) of 3- and Q-quantifiers 
such that 
(1) (S~)(3x)~o~ is a sentence which is consistent with P, 
and 
(2) for each cr~ E, F t- ~(S~)(3x)(~o~ v-la). 
Assume that there are uncountably many ~ ~ T which are not 
strongly omitted by 1-'. Since L(Q) has only countably many for- 
w Models of power ~1 79 
mulas, there exist distinct elements El, E2 a T such that ~0r.~ =~o~, 
(Sz~) = (Sz2), and (1) and (2) hold for both E~ and 22. It follows 
that P does not strongly omit ~;~ u 22, contrary to hypothesis. 
This completes the proof. -t 
For the next lemma we need more notation. We shall say that a 
model ~ realizes a set E(x) of  formulas of L(Q) iff there exists an 
element aE A which satisfies every a 6 N; that is, ~ realizes Z(x) 
iff ~ does not omit :E(x). 
Now consider an arbitrary set @ of formulas ~x)  of L(Q). By 
-lgo we mean the set 
-lgo= {-1~o: ~o~ go}. 
A gO-type is a subset II c go u --lgo such that for all ~0~ r either 
~o~ II or (-1~o) ~ II. Finally, given a model 2)of L, we let go(!8) be 
the set of all go-types which are realized in N. 
Lemma 5.4. Let P be a set o f  sentences and go(x) a set o f  formulas 
o f  L(Q), and let Z,j( Xo) , 2;1(xl), ... be countabO, many sets of for- 
mulas of  L(Q). Suppose P has a standard model ~ such that ~ 
omits each set 2 n and go(q[) is uncountable. Then there is a set M 
o f  standard models of  P such that IMI = 2 '~, each ~E3I  omits 
each set 2 n, and for any two distinct models ~, ~ ~ M, we have 
~(~)~ go(~), and in fact." 
neither ~P(~3) c go( ~) nor go( ~) c go(2~). 
Proof: Let U be a subset of A such that for each go-type X;(x) with 
is realized in ~, there is a unique u ~ U which satisfies 2(x). Let L' 
be the language formed by adding to L the new unary predicate 
symbol U, and let 9l" be the model (9~, U) for L'. We make the fol- 
lowing observations about the model ~': 
( 1 ) g~' is a standard model of P in the sense of L'(Q); 
(2) ~[' ~ (Qx)U(x). 
(3) 917 omits each set Z,(x) ,  n < co. 
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(4) ~f' omits the set of formulas 
A(x,y) = {U(x), U(y),Tx-y} u {~o(x) +-* ~o(y): ~o(x) ~ O}. 
Let P' be the set of all sentences of L' which hold in 91'. Then ]7" 
is consistent, and by lemma 4.2: 
(1') P~P ' .  
(2') F' ]-- (Qx)U(x). 
(3') F' strongly omits each 2;n(x), n < c~. 
(4') P' omits the set of formulas 2x(x,y). 
By Lemma 2.4", P' has a countable weak model (2~0, q0) which 
strongly omits each F,n(X) and A(x,y). We claim that there are two 
O-types II(0), II(t ) and two countable lementary extensions 
(gJ(0), q(o)) and (9I(1), q(l)) of (gt 0,,q0) such that for i = 0, I : 
(5) For all forinulas O(x) of the language of (9~, q0), 
(2[~, qo) ~ (Qx)O(x) if and only if some element 
b ~ A(i ) -  A o satisfies O(x) in (91i~), q(i)). 
(6) (~(i), q(i)) strongly omits each 2n(x), 2x(x,y). 
(7) (91(i), q(i)) realizes .rI{i ). 
(8) (~(i), q(i)) strongly omits II(l_i). 
Let us prove our claim (5) - (8) .  First we note that all the axioms 
of L'(Q) belong to P'. Let P* be the set of all sentences which hold 
in (9~, q0). Then by Theorem 4.6, F* has a standard model 23 
which omits each set 2;n(n) and omits A(x,y), and also, whenever 
(91~,q0) ~ "I(Qy)~(y), no b~B-A  o satisfies qJ(y) in ~3. Let Vbe 
the interpretation of U in 23. Since 2~ omits A(x,y), any two distinct 
elements of V satisfy different O-types in ~. Moreover, by (2') the 
set V is uncountable. Thus uncountably many O-types are realized 
in 23. If IIl(X) and rlz(X ) are two distinct O-types, then the union 
IIt(x ) w H2(x ) is omitted in N, whence by Lemma 4.2, F* strongly 
omits I I i (x)w II2(x ). Therefore, by Lemma 5.3, P* strongly omits 
all but countably many O-types. It follows that there exists a 
cb-type II(0)(x ) which is realized in 23 but is strongly omitted by P*. 
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Let b ~ B be an element wltich satisfies II<o)(X) in ~3, and let r be 
the set of all uncountable subsets of.~3. Let Xc  B be a countable 
set such that whenever (9/~, q0) ~ (QY)~0(y), some b ~ B-A  o satis- 
fies 40') .  By Lemma 5.1, 03, r) has a countable lementary sub- 
model (9/io), q<0)) such that A 0 u {b} u X c A(o ). Let 9I(o ) be the 
reduct of 9/i0) to the language L. Then (9/(o), q(0)) is an elementary 
extension of (9/o, qo). The model ~ and set A(o > were chosen in 
such a way that (5) holds for i = 0. Moreover, b satisfies I1<0 ) in 
(9/(o), q<0)), so (7) holds with i = 0. 
By Lemma 4.2, (~3,r) strongly omits each $n(x) and A(x,y), and 
it follows from Lemma 5.2 that (9/(O), q<0>) also strongly omits 
these sets, whence (6) holds for i = 0. 
Now we again use Theorem 4.6 to obtain a standard model ~ of 
P* which omits each set ~,n(X), A(x,y), and II(0>(x) , and also has 
the property that whenever (9/~, q0) N N(Qy)~(y), no element of 
C-A  o satisfies ~(y). As before, (r realizes uncountably many (I)-types. 
However, using Lemma 5.3 we see that the weak model (9/(o>, q(o>) 
strongly omits all but countably many (P-types. We may therefore 
find a ap-type II(l ) which is realized in ~ and strongly omitted by 
(9/(o>, q(0)). Thus (8) holds with i = 0. Then as before we can find a 
countable lementary submodel (9/ii), q<l)) of G whose reduct to L, 
(92('0), qo>), is an elementary extension of (91o, q0) satisfying (5) 
and realizing II(t ). Using Lemmas 4.2 and 5.2, we see that (6)-(8) 
also hold for i = 1. This proves our claim (5)-(8) .  
We may iterate the procedure just described to obtain a binary 
tree of countable weak models (9/s, qs) and (I)-types IIs, for each 
sequence sE Ua<,o~(a2), such that: 
(9) If s < t (i.e. s is a proper initial segment of t), then 
(9/s, qs) "< (9/t, qt ), and for all O(x ), 
(9/*, qs) ~ (Qx)O(x) if and only if some element bE At -A  s 
satisfies O(x) in (9/*, qt). 
(1 0) Each (9/s, qs) strongly omits each ?_,n(X) and A(x, y). 
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(I 1 ) Each (92s,q s) realizes IIs(x). 
(12) If s<i)~ t, where i E 2, then (9/s, qs) strongly omits 
IlsO_i>(x). 
At the limit ordinals, we may take 
(9{t, qt) = Us<t(9[s, qs) , 
and use Lemmas 2.5 and 2.5*. Note that each sequence s is count- 
able in length, so only countably many Oh-types are required by  
(1 2) to be omitted in (9.Is, qs). 
For each sequence t~ ,or2, let 
(~t, qt) = Os<t(~s, qs) 
with s ranging over the proper initial segments of t. This is the 
union of  an elementary chain, so (9~o,q0) -< (~t, qt). 
Thus (~t, qt) is a model of P. Using (9 ) - (12)  and the proofs of  
the. completeness theorem for L(Q) and of Theorem 4.3, we see 
that each model 9/t has the following properties: 
( 1 3) 2l t is a standard model of P. 
(14) 92 t omits each En(X). 
(15) Fora l l s<t ,  gttrealizesl-ls(x). 
(15) If s<i) < t, then 9/t omits IIs(l_i)(x). 
For each t, gft is a model for L', and we let ~3 t be tile reduct of  ~t 
to L. (Recalt that L' has the extra predicate symbol U.) Then (1 3 ) -  
(16) also hold for each ~t. Let 
M = {~gt: te  c~ 
Then IMI = 2 ~~ . Let t o, t I be two distinct elements of w'2. There is 
a greatest countable sequence s such that s< t o and s< t 1. We may 
assume that 
s (O>< t o , s<]>< t I . 
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Them by (15) and (16), we have 
rI~(0)(x) ~ q~(~to) - ~(~t~ ),  
I I s (1 ) (x  ) E gP(~t l  ) --  ~(~to  ) . 
This shows that neither of the sets ~(2~to), gP(~q) is included in the 
other. -~ 
The above Iemma can be generalized to types in finitely many 
variables. If ~P(x 1... x m) is a set of formulas of L(Q) with the free 
variables x 1 ..... Xm, then the notion of a qS-type and the set ~(~)  
are defined in the obvious ways. 
Lelnma 5.5. Let P be a set o f  sentences and rb(Xl...Xm) a set o f  for- 
mulas of L(Q), and let ~n(Yn 1... Ynpn), n < ~, be sets o f formulas 
of  L(Q). Suppose P hasa standard model ~ such that 9~ omits each 
set ~ and cb(91) is uncountable. Then there is a set M o f  standard 
models of  F such that I M I = 2t~ each ~ ~ M omits each ~ n and has 
power <~ ~o 1, and for any two distinct ~,  E~M we have: 
neither ~p(~) c cp( ~) nor ~( ~) c ep(~8) . 
The proof is similar to that of Lernma 5.4. However, instead of 
the model (9i, U) we form a model (91, F, U) where F maps A m one- 
one onto A, and for each O-type ~(xl . . .Xm)E ep(91) there is a unique 
m-tuple (a 1 ..... a m) ~ A m which satisfies 2;(x t ... Xm) and such that 
F(al... am) E U. The set of formulas A(x,y)  must then be replaced 
by an appropriate set 
A(X l . . .XmYl . . .Y  m) , 
such that a model omits A iff no two distinct m-tuples whose F- 
images belong to U satisfy the same ~-type. 
Let us now exploit Lemma 5.5 to give some new results about 
the model theory of first order logic L. The reason the lemma gives 
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results about models for L is that in the language L(Q) one can say 
that the universe is uncoutable. 
By a type in n variables for L we mean a O-type where 9 is the 
set of all fornmlas ~o(x 1... x n) of L. A type in n variables for L(Q) 
is a O-type where 9 is the set of all formulas r 1... x n) of L(Q). 
Thus in each model 9I for L, each n-tuple satisfies a unique type II 
in L and also a unique type H' 3 H in L(Q). 
Corollary 5.6. Let P be a set o f  sentences of L such that, for some 
m< co, there are uncountably many types in m variables for L 
which are consistent with P. Then P has 2 ~~ non-isomorphic mod- 
els of  power col. 
Proof: P obviously has at most 2 ~~ non-isomorphic models of 
power col. By the compactness theorem, P has a model 91 of power 
09 1 which realizes col different ypes in m variables for L. Let 9 be 
the set of all formulas ~o(x 1... x m) of L. Let r" = P u ((Qx)x = x}. 
Then 9~ is a standard model of P' because 9I is uncountable. The 
desired result follows from Lemma 5.5, for O(23)~ O(~) implies 
that 23 and f~ are not isomorphic, and any standard model of P' is 
an uncountable model of P. -I 
The above corollary has the stronger form: 
Corollary 5.7. Let P be a set of  sentences of  L and ~"n(Yn 1".. Ynpn), 
n < co be sets of  formulas o f  L. Assume that P has a model 91 which 
omits each P'n and such that for some m < co, 91 realizes uncount- 
ably many different ypes in m variables for L. Then P has 2 ~~ non- 
isomorphic models o f  power col which omit each Zn" 
Corollary 5.8. Let F be a set o f  sentences of  L and let ]~n(Ynl... ynp n) 
be sets o f  formulas of  L. Suppose F has a model 91 o f  power col 
which omits each 7, n. Then: 
(i) For each m < co, the set of  all types H in m variables for L, 
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such that every model of  P o f  power 6o 1 which omits each ~n real- 
izes 1"I, is countable. 
(ii) More generally, let T be any family of  sets 1-I(Xl... x m) of  for- 
mulas of  L such that each element of ~ satisfies at most one mem- 
ber of  T. Then the set o f  all I I~ T, such that every model o f f  of 
power 6o 1 which omits each ~,2 realizes II, is countable. 
Proof: Let P' be the set of all sentences of L(Q) which hold in the 
model ~. Then, since ~ is an uncountable model of l-', we have 
(1) PcP ' ,  (Qx) (x -x )~P ' .  
Moreover, since g[ omits each set 2;n, it follows from Lemma 4.2 
that P' strongly omits each I222. For any two distinct members 
II 1 , II 2 of T, 9~ omits 1-[ 1 a 1"[2, whence I" strongly omits I I  1 U rI 2. 
Therefore by Lemma 5.3, P' strongly omits all but countably many 
II ~ T. (We are actually using the obvious generalizations of Lemmas 
4.2 and 4.3 to sets of formulas in finitely many variables.) If Pc  T 
and 1-" strongly omits lI, then by Theorem 4.6 1-" has a standard 
model ~ which omits II and omits each 2n. By (1), 2~ is an un- 
countable model of P, and the conclusion follows.-I 
The above Corollary should be compared with the following re- 
sult of Ehrenfeucht and Mostowski [ 5 ]. 
Let P be a set o f  sentences of  L which has an infinite model. 
Then for every cardinal ~ >~ co, P has a model 9/, o f  power ~ such 
that for each m < co, only countably many types in m variables for 
L are realized in ~. 
This result is stronger than Corollary 5.8 in the case that the sets 
E n are not present. It is easy to give an example of sets P and E(x) 
in L such that P has an uncountable model omitting E but every 
uncountable model of P which omits E realizes uncountably many 
types in one variable. For example, let 1" be the complete theory 
of the model 
(~ u S(co), co, e, O, 1, ...) 
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and let 2;(x) be the set 
(xc  60} U (-lx = O, . i x -  1,..3 9 
Using the same proofs as above, we have 
Corollary 5,9. Corollaries 5. 7 and 5. 8 remain true when either: 
(i) L is replaced by Lto and "model" is replaced by "w-model". 
(ii) L is replaced by L(Q) and "model" is replaced by ''standard 
model". 
(iii) L is replaced by L~~ and "model" is replaced by "standard 
co-model" 
Corollaries 5.7 and 5.8 also have the following generalization to 
Lto 1 to. 
Corollary 5.10. Let 0 be a sentence of  Lto I to and let r 1... Xm) be 
a countable set of  formulas of  L~ol~, each with at most the free 
variables x1 ..... x m. Suppose 0 has a model ~ which realizes un- 
countably many different cI,-types. Then 0 has exactly 2 ~ non- 
isomorphic models of  power 601. 
The same result holds if L~ w is replaced by Ltolto(Q), and "mod- 
el" is replaced by "standard model". 
Corollary 5.1 1. Let 0 be a sentence of  L~tto, let 6P(Xl...Xm) be a 
countable set of  formulas of  Ltol~, and let T be a family o f  subsets 
of  r Suppose that 0 has a model 9.1 of  power 601, and that each 
element of  A satisfies at most one member o f  Z Then the set 
{HE T: (3Xl. . .xm)AII  holds in every model o f  O of  
power 601} 
is countable. 
Again, the same result holds with L~otto(Q) in place of  Ltol~, and 
"standard model" in place of  "model". 
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Note that Corollaries 5.10 and 5.11 imply 5.7 and 5.8 respec- 
tively, since we can take 
0 = AF i An< w 7(_qYnl...YnPn) A ~n " 
Corollaries 5.10 and 5.11 can be proved frorn 5.7 and 5.8 by using 
the technique which was described in proving the completeness 
theorem for L~tto(Q). Namely, one adds a new relation symbol Rr 
for each formula qJ which is either a subformula of 0 or a subfor- 
mula of some ~oE (b, and then appliues 5.7 and 5.8 to appropriate F 
and En'S in the language L with these extra symbols. 
We conclude this paper with some refinements of the applica- 
tions to models of second order arithmetic and set theory given in 
w 
Give the set 2 =[0, 1} the discrete topology, and for each set A, 
give the set A2 of all functions on A into 2 the product opology. 
Then we obtain a topology on the power set S(A) by identifying 
each subset of A with its characteristic function. The basic closed 
sets in the topology on S(A) are all sets Est where s and t are finite 
subsets of A and 
Est={Y~S(A) :  Yns~O or (A -Y )nt4=O}.  
If the set A is countable, then there are only countably many basic 
closed sets, so every closed set is a countable intersection of basic 
closed sets. A countable union of closed sets is called an F a set. 
The following applications use the notation of 3 .12-  3.13. The 
notion of a set 1-' of sentences of L2(Q) strongly omitting a set E(X) 
of formulas is defined just like the notion of strong omitting in 
L(Q). Tlfis time the string of quantifiers (S) may contain quantifiers 
of the form (3y), (3 Y), and (Q Y). The methods of w 4 and w 5 
above yield the following lemma for the logic L2(Q): 
Lemma 5.12. Assume that: 
(i) P is a consistent set o f  sentences of  Lz(Q). 
(ii) Co, c 1, c2 .... are individual constants of  L 2 such that for any 
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formula ~o(x), i f  (3x)~o(x) is consistent with P then there is a 
c n such that ~o(c n) is consistent with I'. 
(iii) I" strongly omits each o f  the sets No(X), Ni (X) ,  N2(X), .... 
(iv) P t- (QX) (X = X). 
7"hen there are 2 '''~ non-isomorphic standard models 9.[ o f  P of  
power col such that A = {a0, ai, ...} and 9i omits Zn" 
The above lemma is an improvement of Corollary 3.10.2. To 
prove it, one first imitates the proof of Theorem 4.3 to get one 
standard model 9.[ of P of the required kind. (iv) is used to make 9i 
of power coi. Then one imitates the proof of Lemma 5.4 where 
9 (X) is the set of all formulas of the forms 
c n E X ,  7c  m E X .  
The following theorem is an improved version of Theorem 3.1 3. 
Theorem 5.13. Let C be a countable co-model o f  second order num- 
ber theory. Let E c S( co) be an F~ set such that C n E=0.  Then 
there are 2 w~ different co-models D such that D has power 6o 1, D is 
an elementary extension of  C, and D n E = O. 
Proof: Let 9i*, F, and ~ be as in the proof of Theorem 3.11. From 
the proof of 3.11, P satisfies (i), (ii), and (iv). The F o set E may be 
represented in the form 
E = Un<az ('Ira< w Es(m,n)t(m,n) 
where the s(m, n) and t(m, n) are finite subsets of co. For each 
m,n< co, let 
Omn(X ) = (Vpes(m,n) C p E X)  v (Vq, et(m,n) TC q @ X)  
(where an empty disjunction denotes (TX~ X)). Thus a set Xc  co 
satisfies Crmn(X) if and only if XE Es(m,n)t(m,n). Let 
}in(X) = {Omn(X): m < co}. 
Then an co-modelD omits each set of formulas 2n(X) if and only 
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i fDn  E=0.  It was observed in the proof of 3.13 that if ~* is a 
standard model of P in which every individual is an interpretation 
of some cn, then the reduct of N to L 2 is isomorphic to an co-model 
of power col which is an elementary extension of C. It is also easy 
to see that if two standard models of P, in which every individual 
is an interpretation of a c n, are non-isomorphic then their reducts 
to L 2 are non-isomorphic; because by the axiom of extensionality 
every class is uniquely determined by the set of c n whose interpre- 
tations belong to it, and also every c n is equal to the term sn0 of 
L 2. Therefore, to prove the theorem it suffices to show that P sat- 
isfies hypothesis (iii) of Lemma 5.12..That is, P strongly omits 
each ~n(X) .  
Let n < w. Assume that the sentence (S)(3X)~o is consistent 
with IF', where (S) is a string of 3 and Q quantifiers. Suppose, how- 
ever, that 
(1) Fora l lm<co,  P~-7(S) (3X) (~oA- l~mn) .  
We shall prove that Cn E r 0, and this contradiction will show that 
(1) is false and hence that P strongly omits En(X). 
We first associate two finite subsets of co with each natural num- 
ber n. For instance, let 
s(n) = {rn: the (2m)th prime divides n + i}, 
t(n) = {m: the (2m+ 1 )st prime divides n + 1}. 
Then there is a formula #J(X,y) such that for each natural number n, 
P ~" ~(X, cn) <-+ (Up~.s(n)C p E .J() v (Vq~.t(n)TC q E X)  . 
We have, by 3.1 and Axiom 5 for L2(Q) , 
P t- -7 (3y) (S) (3X)[~o A-I~(X, y) A 7 (S) (3X) (~o A7 qJ(X, y))], 
1-' t- -1 (S) (?X) (3y)[~o A -7 ~ (X, y) ^  -7 (S) (3X) (~p ^  -7 ~(X, y))], 
p ~- 7 (s) (3x)[~, ^ 7 (vy)[ r y) v (s) (3x) (~o A 7 r y))] ]. 
Using 3.1 and the fact that (S)(~X)~o is consistent with I', we see 
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that 
(S) (3X) (Vy) [ ~(X, y) v (S) (:IX) (~o A -1"~ (X, y))] ,  
is consistent with P. Hence tile sentence 
(3X) (Vy)[ ~(X, y) v (S) (3X) (~o A 9 if(X, y) ] 
is consistent with P. By the remark (2) in the proof of 3.1 3, there 
is a formula 0(y) of L~' such that 
P P 0 (3 , )~ (S ) (3X) (~Aqr  
Then the sentence 
(2) (3X) (Vy) (~(X ,y )  v O(y)) 
is consistent with P. Since the sentence (2) belongs to L~ and every 
sentence of L~ which holds in 9~* belongs to P, the sentence (2) 
holds in ~*. Therefore there is an element U~ C such that 
(3) P P (Vy)(~(Cu,Y)vO(y))  . 
Let m < w. Then there exists r < w such that s(r)=s(m, n) and 
t(r) = t(m, n). Thus 
(4) F H ~(X, c r) ~-+ amn(X) 9 
Hence by ( 1 ), 
I" H -](S)(3X)(~ A "-]~(X, Or)),  
whence 
(5) P P q0(er) 9 
By (3) and (5), 
P I-- r c r) , 
thence by (4), 
P H gmn(r 9 
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Since this holds for all m < w, we have 
U E ['1 m ~r , 
whence U6 Cn  Er  O. --t 
By a similar argument one can prove the following 
Theorem 5.14. (i) Let 2f = (A, C,... ) be a countable model of  the 
theory Pp o f  3. ] 4. Suppose there is a formula r(x, y) such that for 
every finite s c A there exists b ~ A with 
s = {aEA:  ~[ ~ 7r[a, b]} . 
Let  H C S(A ) be an F a set such that Cn  H= O. Then there are 2 r176 
different models 2~ = (B, D .... ) for L 2 such that." 
(a) ~ is an elementary extension o f  9; 
(b) B = A; 
(c) D has power coa ; 
(d) D n H = 0. 
(ii) Let ~f = (A,E) be a countable model of  ZF, c~A,  (A,E) 
"1S(c)l is a regular cardinar', and let 
S(c) 9~ = (aE: ~ ~ aES(c)} . 
Suppose that H c S(c~) is an F a set and S(c) 7I n H = O. Then there 
are 2 ~~  non-isomorphic mode& ,2] = (B, F, a)a, c g such that." 
(a) (A,E)  -< (B,F) ; 
(b) c y = ce; 
(c) S(c) ~B has power co 1 ; 
(d) S(c)~n H= 0. 
(iii) Let  (A, e) be a countable transitive -model o f  ZF, let c~A,  
and suppose (A, c) ~ cE WO | ^S(c)q~ WO | Let H c S(c ) be an F a 
set such that A n H = O. Then there are 2 ~~ different e-models (B, e) 
such that 
(a) There is an elementary embedding f: <A, e)-< <B, e) 
which maps the ordinals o f (A ,  e) onto the ordinals 
of (B,  e); 
(b) B c~ S(c) has power 6ol ; 
(c )BnH= O. 
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